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After more than three decades during which it gave the issue scant attention, the 
Supreme Court has again made the American Pipe doctrine an active part of its docket. 
American Pipe addresses the tolling of statutes of limitations in federal class action 
litigation. When plaintiffs file a putative class action in federal court and class certification 
is denied, absent members of the putative class may wish to pursue their claims in some 
kind of further proceeding. If the statute of limitations would otherwise have expired while 
the class certification issue was being resolved, these claimants may need the benefit of a 
tolling rule. The same need can arise for those who wish to opt out of a certified class 
action. American Pipe and its progeny provide such a tolling rule in some circumstances, 
but many unanswered questions remain about when the doctrine is available. 
In June 2017, the Court decided CalPERS v. ANZ Securities, holding that 
American Pipe tolling was foreclosed to a class member who opted out of a certified class 
in an action brought to enforce a federal statute (the Securities Act of 1933) that contained 
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what the Court labeled a “statute of repose.” In June 2018, the Court decided Resh v. 
China Agritech, which held that American Pipe tolling is not available when absent 
members of a putative class file another class action following the denial of certification in 
the first action rather than pursuing their claims individually in subsequent proceedings. 
In this Article we develop a comprehensive theoretical and doctrinal framework 
for the American Pipe doctrine. Building on earlier work, we demonstrate that 
American Pipe tolling is a federal common-law rule that aims to carry into effect 
the provisions and policies of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, the federal class 
action device. Contrary to the Court’s assertion in CalPERS, American Pipe is not 
an “equitable tolling doctrine.” Neither is it the product of a direct mandate in Rule 
23, which is the source of authority, not the source of the rule. Having clarified the 
status of American Pipe tolling as federal common law, we explain the basis on 
which the doctrine operates across jurisdictions, binding subsequent actions in both 
federal and state court. We argue that the doctrine applies whether the initial action 
in federal court was based on a federal or state cause of action—a question that has 
produced disagreement among the lower federal courts. And we situate American 
Pipe within the framework of the Court’s Erie jurisprudence, explaining how the 
doctrine should operate when the putative class action was in federal court based on 
diversity jurisdiction and the courts of the state in which it was filed would apply a 
different rule. Finally, we discuss how CalPERS should have been decided if the 
Court had recognized the true nature of the American Pipe rule and if it had engaged 
the legislative history of the Securities Act rather than relying on labels. 
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   INTRODUCTION 
Federal class actions often raise questions about the application in that 
setting of rules that were written with litigation involving individual parties 
in mind. Such questions are of obvious potential systemic importance when 
they concern rules of jurisdiction—subject matter, personal, or appellate. 
Litigants may regard as no less important questions that arise from rules that 
federal courts apply once they have jurisdiction, and the answers may also 
have systemic importance, even if not obvious. Questions of both types have 
long been with us, and the Supreme Court has usually, but not always, sought 
to answer them with due regard to the practical dimensions of litigation from 
the perspective of both the litigants and the federal judiciary, and to the bearing 
of such pragmatic considerations on the policies underlying the relevant rules. 
The Court confronted such a question when determining statutory 
diversity of citizenship in class action litigation. It opted to consider only the 
citizenship of named class representatives, rather than treating a class suit as 
an amalgam of claims by individuals, an approach that would have excluded 
most such suits from federal court.1 Yet, concerned that diversity class actions 
under amended Rule 23 would overtax the limited resources of the federal 
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1 See Devlin v. Scardelletti, 536 U.S. 1, 10 (2002) (“[C]onsidering all class members for these 
purposes would destroy diversity in almost all class actions. Nonnamed class members are, therefore, 
not parties in that respect.”); Supreme Tribe of Ben Hur v. Cauble, 255 U.S. 356, 367 (1921) (“If the 
federal courts are to have the jurisdiction in class suits to which they are obviously entitled, the 
decree when rendered must bind all of the class properly represented.”). The Court has adhered to 
that rule even after the advent of class actions that are harder to square with traditional 
representational justifications, as are many that, since 1966, are eligible for certification under Rule 
23(b)(3). See James E. Pfander, Protective Jurisdiction, Aggregate Litigation, and the Limits of Article III, 
95 CALIF. L. REV. 1423, 1456 (2007) (“To date, the Court has not seen fit to consider the application 
of Cauble to (b)(3) class actions or to consider why the lower courts have extended the Cauble rule.”). 
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judiciary, the Court took care when choosing between existing nonclass 
models for calculating the amount in controversy required by the diversity 
statute. The Court’s choices, forbidding the aggregation of the claims of 
putative class members and requiring each of them to satisfy the amount-in 
controversy requirement, had the purpose and effect of keeping class actions 
packaging small state law claims out of federal court.2 
The advent of the modern class action in 1966 proliferated questions of 
this sort that arose in federal court. The inconsistency of the Court’s answers, 
which alternated between views of the class action as a joinder or 
representational device, suggests the limitations of theory in a domain that 
puts in play so insistently the practical interests of litigants and of the 
institutional judiciary.3 Moreover, by the late-1990s, when the Court returned 
to class actions after a long vacation, they had become a focal point of efforts 
to retrench federal litigation, and thus of partisan and ideological conflict, in 
Congress.4 Proponents of federal litigation retrenchment understood that its 
prospects were best in the increasingly conservative federal courts. The hard-
won enactment of the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005,5 which reflected that 
understanding,6 enabled Congress to ship the ideological conflict to the 
federal courts, where, abetted by migrating interest group pressure, over the 
 
2 See Zahn v. Int’l Paper Co., 414 U.S. 291 (1973) (holding that all claims must meet amount-
in-controversy requirement); Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332, 341 (1969) (“There is no compelling 
reason for this Court to overturn a settled interpretation of an important congressional statute in 
order to add to the burdens of an already overloaded federal court system.”). For the models rejected 
in these cases, see Zahn, 414 U.S. at 305 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“[P]etitioners make no argument 
inconsistent with the Court’s holding that the theory of ‘joint’ claims or interests will not support 
jurisdiction over the nonappearing members of their class. Their contention is rather that a second 
theory, ancillary jurisdiction, supports a determination that those claims may be entertained.”); 
Snyder, 394 U.S. at 353 (Fortas, J., dissenting) (“[I]t is hard to understand why the fact that the 
alleged claims are, in terms of the old Rule categories, ‘several’ rather than ‘joint,’ means that the 
‘matter in controversy’ for jurisdictional amount purposes must be regarded as the $7.81 Mr. Coburn 
claims instead of the thousands of dollars of alleged overcharges of the whole class, the status of all 
of which would be determined by the judgment.”). 
3 See Diane Wood Hutchinson, Class Actions: Joinder or Representational Device?, 1983 SUP. CT. 
REV. 459, 459 (“Each Term, the Supreme Court faces a wide variety of issues that should require a 
choice between two models of the modern class action: a joinder model and a representational 
model. Yet the Court has shown no awareness of the choices it has been making.”). David Marcus 
reframes the post-1966 antinomy in terms of a struggle between an “adjectival conception” and a 
“regulatory conception.” See David Marcus, The History of the Modern Class Action, Part I: Sturm und 
Drang, 1953–1980, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 587, 592-97 (2013). 
4 See Stephen B. Burbank & Sean Farhang, Class Actions and the Counterrevolution Against Federal 
Litigation, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 1495, 1510, 1520 (2017) [hereinafter Class Actions and the Counterrevolution]. 
5 Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (codified in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.). 
6 See Burbank & Farhang, Class Actions and the Counterrevolution, supra note 4, at 1511 (“[The Class 
Action Fairness Act] channeled class actions into the federal courts, an institutional environment in 
which more aggressive retrenchment was possible under a transsubstantive Federal Rule.”). 
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subsequent decade it played an ever-growing and more polarizing influence 
on Supreme Court justices in the Court’s class action cases.7 
One of the questions implicating the view courts should take of class 
actions that assumed prominence soon after the 1966 amendments to Rule 23 
involved the treatment of the claims of absent members of a putative class 
under the pertinent statute of limitations. Before those amendments, the 
lower federal courts had reached inconsistent decisions on limitations issues 
in so-called spurious class actions when individuals seeking to take advantage 
of a favorable judgment sought to intervene after the limitations period had 
run.8 In American Pipe & Construction Co. v. Utah, the Supreme Court 
considered a similar question as to intervention by absent members of a 
putative Rule 23(b)(3) class action following the denial of class certification. 
The American Pipe Court held that “the commencement of the original class 
suit tolls the running of the statute for all purported members of the class 
who make timely motions to intervene after the court has found the suit 
inappropriate for class action status.”9 That was because a “contrary rule 
allowing participation only by those potential members of the class who had 
earlier filed motions to intervene in the suit would deprive Rule 23 class 
actions of the efficiency and economy of litigation which is a principal 
purpose of the procedure.”10 
American Pipe itself gave rise to numerous questions, some of which still 
lack definitive answers more than forty years later. The Court answered one of 
them in Crown, Cork & Seal Co. v. Parker,11 holding that American Pipe tolling 
is also available to members of a putative class who choose to file individual 
actions, instead of intervening, after class certification is denied. Another 
question that arose following American Pipe was the subject of a recent Supreme 
Court decision. In California Public Employees’ Retirement System v. ANZ 
Securities, Inc. (CalPERS),12 the Court (5–4) held that American Pipe tolling was 
not available to a member of a putative class asserting claims under section 11 
 
7 See id. at 1517-28. 
8 See Am. Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 449-50 (1974) (discussing conflict among 
lower court decisions); Joseph J. Simeone, Procedural Problems of Class Suits, 60 MICH. L. REV. 905, 
938-39 (1962); Barney B. Welsh, Comment, Class Actions Under New Rule 23 and Federal Statutes of 
Limitation: A Study of Conflicting Rationale, 13 VILL. L. REV. 370, 374-82 (1968). 
9 American Pipe, 414 U.S at 553. 
10 Id. 
11 462 U.S. 345 (1983). 
12 137 S. Ct. 2042 (2017). Burbank participated in an amicus brief that sought to estimate the 
protective filings that plausibly would ensue if the Court affirmed the Second Circuit’s decision in 
CalPERS. See Brief of Civil Procedure and Secs. Law Professors as Amici Curiae Supporting 
Petitioner, Cal. Pub. Emps.’ Ret. Sys. v. ANZ Secs., Inc., 137 S. Ct. 2042 (2017) (No. 16-373) 
[hereinafter “Professors’ Amicus Brief”]. 
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of the 1933 Securities Act13 who commenced a separate lawsuit against the same 
defendants, raising the same claims, and thereafter opted out of the class, both 
beyond the governing limitation periods in section 13.14 
The CalPERS Court deemed the one-year bar in section 13 a statute of 
limitations and its three-year bar a statute of repose, distinguishing them on 
the ground that statutes of repose “are enacted to give more explicit and 
certain protection to defendants”15 and “effect a legislative judgment that a 
defendant should be free from liability after the legislatively determined 
period of time.”16 Noting that the question of tolling is one “of statutory 
intent,”17 the Court relied on previous decisions for the conclusion that “the 
unqualified nature of [a statute of repose] supersedes the courts’ residual 
authority and forecloses the extension of the statutory period based on 
equitable principles. For this reason, the Court repeatedly has stated in broad 
terms that statutes of repose are not subject to equitable tolling.”18 
Turning to the nature of American Pipe tolling, the Court concluded that 
“the source of the tolling rule applied in American Pipe is the judicial power 
to promote equity, rather than to interpret and enforce statutory 
provisions.”19 The Court reasoned that “[n]othing in the American Pipe 
opinion suggests that the tolling rule it created was mandated by the text of 
a statute or federal rule. . . . The Court’s holding was instead grounded in the 
traditional equitable powers of the judiciary.”20 
Finally, the CalPERS Court addressed petitioner’s argument that “dismissal 
of its individual suit as untimely would eviscerate its ability to opt out.” 
Although acknowledging that this was “an ability this Court has indicated should 
not be disregarded,” the Court dispatched the concern with the observation that 
“[i]t does not follow, however, from any privilege to opt out that an ensuing suit 
can be filed without regard to mandatory time limits set by statute.”21 
 
13 15 U.S.C. § 77(a) (2012). 
14 Section 13 of the Act provides: 
No action shall be maintained to enforce any liability created under [section 11] unless 
brought within one year after the discovery of the untrue statement or the omission, 
or after such discovery should have been made by the exercise of reasonable diligence 
. . . . In no event shall any such action be brought to enforce a liability created under 
[section 11] more than three years after the security was bona fide offered to the public. 
Id. § 77(m). 
15 CalPERS, 137 S. Ct. at 2049. 
16 Id. (quoting CTS Corp. v. Waldburger, 134 S. Ct. 2175, 2183 (2014)). 
17 Id. at 2050 (quoting Lozano v. Montoya Alvarez, 134 S. Ct. 1224, 1232 (2014)). 
18 Id. at 2051. 
19 Id. 
20 Id. at 2051-52. 
21 Id. at 2053.  
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We believe that the Court’s decision in CalPERS is deeply flawed for 
many of the reasons advanced by the four dissenting justices,22 as well as many 
others. Our primary goal in this Article, however, is not to dispute the result 
in that case (although we do). Rather, we highlight CalPERS because the 
Court’s opinion compounds confusion concerning the source, reach, and 
limits of the tolling rule for federal class actions that originated in American 
Pipe—confusion that the dissent does not dispel. Much of this confusion, we 
argue, results from the failure to engage seriously the sources of authority for 
federal law, and to distinguish sources of authority from sources of rules. It 
has been abetted by a jurisprudence of labels.23 CalPERS suggests, as does the 
alignment of the Justices,24 that confusion about sources of authority for 
federal tolling law may also have been abetted by ideology, whether the 
distaste of some Justices for the power of Rule 23 to catalyze the enforcement 
of substantive law and regulatory policy or their predisposition to protect the 
interests of business.25 The Court’s subsequent opinion in Resh took some 
modest steps away from the erroneous treatment of American Pipe as an 
equitable tolling doctrine, but those steps were partial and imperfect. 
Careful attention to the source of the tolling rule applied in American Pipe 
and its progeny, to sources of authority for federal law, and to the distinction 
between sources of authority and sources of rules, leads us to reaffirm that 
 
22 See id. at 2056-58 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
23 ”The marvelous capacity of a Latin phrase to serve as a substitute for reasoning, and the 
confusion of thought inevitably accompanying the use of inaccurate terminology, are nowhere better 
illustrated than in the decisions dealing with the admissibility of evidence as ‘res gestae.’” Edmund M. 
Morgan, A Suggested Classification of Utterances Admissible as Res Gestae, 31 YALE L.J. 229, 229 (1922). 
Always unsatisfactory, decision by label is particularly so in the class action context because it is 
inconsistent with an overarching goal of those who drafted the 1966 amendments to the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure’s joinder rules, including Rule 23. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23 advisory committee’s note 
to 1966 amendment (“the terms ‘joint,’ ‘common,’ etc., which were used as the basis of the Rule 23 
classification proved obscure and uncertain”); FED. R. CIV. P. 19 advisory committee’s note to 1966 
amendment (“The use of ‘indispensable’ and ‘joint interest’ in the context of original Rule 19 . . . 
distracted attention from the pragmatic considerations which should be controlling.”). 
24 See CalPERS, 137 S. Ct. at 2046. The majority included all of the Court’s conservative 
Justices, while all of the liberal Justices were in dissent. This is consistent with recent research, which 
demonstrates that the “Supreme Court, led by its conservative wing, has issued a series of decisions 
making the governing legal rules more difficult for those seeking private enforcement through class 
actions.” Burbank & Farhang, Class Actions and the Counterrevolution, supra note 4, at 1529. 
25 See Burbank & Farhang, Class Actions and the Counterrevolution, supra note 4, at 1517-28. 
Ideology is the sire of teleology. See Stephen B. Burbank, Hold the Corks: A Comment on Paul 
Carrington’s “Substance” and “Procedure” in the Rules Enabling Act, 1989 DUKE L.J. 1012, 1017-18 
[hereinafter Hold the Corks] (discussing cases disagreeing whether protection of defendants from 
stale claims is a policy of statutes of limitations as opposed to statutes of repose). In this light, the 
fact that many so-called “statutes of repose”—in particular those affecting product liability and 
medical malpractice suits—were children of the tort reform movement in the 1970s seems relevant. 
See generally Frances E. McGovern, The Variety, Policy and Constitutionality of Product Liability Statutes 
of Repose, 30 AM. U. L. REV. 579 (1981). 
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the tolling rule announced in that case is a rule of federal common law. We 
start, in Part I, by providing a detailed analysis of American Pipe and its 
progeny in order to pin down what the Court itself regarded as the source of 
the tolling rule involved in those cases.26 We then turn, in Part II, to that 
rule’s source of authority. Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are neither 
statutes nor the product of judicial power, but they have the capacity of 
statutes to generate and legitimate exercises of federal judicial lawmaking 
when necessary to protect provisions and policies that are within their proper 
domain under the Rules Enabling Act (REA).27 Rule 23 is not the source of 
American Pipe tolling, but it is the source of the procedural policies that the 
federal courts are carrying into effect through their authority to promulgate 
federal common law.28 
We thus demonstrate that, contrary to a suggestion in CalPERS, federal 
judicial power on limitations issues is not confined to “promot[ing] equity” 
and “interpret[ing] and enforc[ing] statutory provisions.”29 The existence of 
positive federal law either providing for or requiring judicial supplementation 
presents other occasions for federal common law, with potentially different 
reach and limits than those of the law that federal courts fashion in order to 
govern their own proceedings. Designed primarily to serve the institutional 
interests of the federal courts, but having immediate regulatory consequences 
and, necessarily, collateral effects, the tolling rule emerging from American 
Pipe and its progeny is a rule of federal common law. 
In Part III, we assess the reach and limits of the federal common-law rule 
emerging from American Pipe and its progeny. Valid federal common law 
applies in state courts as well as federal courts when necessary to make its 
mandate effective. Although Rule 23’s direct application is confined to the 
federal courts, not so a federal common-law rule deemed necessary to protect 
its policies, provisions, and ultimately the federal courts as an independent 
adjudicatory system.30 As we explain in Part III.A, if state courts could 
 
26 See infra text accompanying notes 34–161 (Part  I). 
27 See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2072–74 (2012). 
28 See infra text accompanying notes 162–200 (Part II). 
29 CalPERS, 137 S. Ct. at 2051, quoted supra text accompanying note 19. The Court’s impoverished 
account of federal judicial power closely tracks Respondents’ brief. See, e.g., Brief for Respondents at 
29, Cal. Pub. Emps.’ Ret. Sys. v. ANZ Secs., Inc., 137 S. Ct. 2042 (2017) (No. 16-373) [hereinafter 
Respondents’ Brief] (“Indeed, the ‘tolling rule’ applied in American Pipe could not have been anything 
other than a rule of equitable tolling . . . . Where a statute lacks an express command to pause the 
running of a deadline, a court’s only basis for extension is equitable tolling—and only then if it is 
consistent with the text and purpose of the statute, as American Pipe itself recognized.”); see also id. at 
32 (“It would be implausible, to say the least, to suggest that American Pipe’s tolling rule was premised 
on a procedural rule that says exactly nothing about tolling or time limits.”). 
30 At this point we are still discussing American Pipe tolling in a federal question case subject 
to a federal limitations provision. 
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disregard the federal tolling rule and apply their own law to a subsequent 
individual action, the claimant’s rights under federal substantive law could be 
extinguished. Although nothing in federal law requires state courts to 
recognize tolling in aid of the class action law and policies of other states, 
pertinent and valid federal common law is binding on state courts under the 
Supremacy Clause of Article VI.31 
In Part III.B, we conclude that the federal common law tolling rule 
emerging from American Pipe and its progeny is not restricted to federal 
question cases involving federal limitations periods. Most controversially, we 
conclude that American Pipe tolling governs in federal diversity class actions 
even if the law of the state in which the federal court sits as F1 is to the 
contrary, and that the rule is similarly binding in subsequent litigation 
brought in state or federal court by a member of the putative or certified class 
asserting the same claims.32 
Finally, in Part IV, we consider whether the result in CalPERS should have 
been different if the Court had properly conceived the tolling rule emerging 
from American Pipe and its progeny. Labels did double duty in Justice 
Kennedy’s opinion for the Court, enabling him to take cover behind the 
notion that “equitable tolling” is never available for statutes of repose and 
also behind the notion that “statutes of repose” accord special rights that are 
immune to the considerations that drove the accommodation of limitations 
law to the class action context in American Pipe. This cover enabled him to 
avoid seriously addressing whether tolling would be inconsistent with the 
particular limitations/repose provision in the Securities Act. A deeper 
examination of the structure and history of that provision than the Court 
undertook demonstrates that the dissent had the better of the argument. In 
that regard, we return to the observation with which we started. Whether in 
1933 or today, such two-tiered provisions, like simple statutes of limitations, 
are usually constructed on the model of nonclass litigation. Where that is 
true, if a defendant is given adequate notice of a claim by a putative class 
member within the longer period, the statutory purposes are served.33 
I. AMERICAN PIPE TOLLING: SOURCE OF THE RULE 
Just as it is best to start with the text when interpreting a federal statute, 
it is also important to identify the legal basis of a federal judicial decision—
whether it rests on the Constitution, a statute, a Federal Rule, judge-made 
 
31 See infra text accompanying notes 204–215 (Part III.A). 
32 See Stephen B. Burbank & Tobias Barrington Wolff, Redeeming the Missed Opportunities of 
Shady Grove, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 17, 50 (2010) [hereinafter Redeeming the Missed Opportunities] (noting 
that it “is a difficult question”); infra text accompanying notes 216–277 (Part III.B).. 
33 See infra text accompanying notes 278–336 (Part IV). 
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law, or some other source of federal law. Close attention to the Court’s 
opinions in American Pipe and subsequent decisions applying its tolling rule 
enables informed choice among the legal bases that might support that rule. 
The task is not as daunting as might be imagined, since there are very few 
Supreme Court decisions that actually engage with American Pipe. At the 
outset, however, it is important to distinguish between (1) alternative legal 
bases for American Pipe tolling and (2) the labels for such bases that have been 
used by the courts, which include “equitable tolling,” “legal tolling,” “statutory 
tolling,” and “class action tolling.” As will become apparent, all of these labels 
are ambiguous, if not “obscure and uncertain.”34 
A. American Pipe: Federal Common Law vs. Federal Rule, and Institutional vs. 
Equitable Interests 
American Pipe involved antitrust litigation under the Clayton Act, which 
contains its own limitations provisions.35 The question was whether, in an 
action that was timely filed, members of a putative class could intervene after 
certification was denied and the limitations period had run. The structure of 
the Court’s opinion appears to have escaped many readers. The opinion opens 
with the observation that “[t]his case involves an aspect of the relationship 
between a statute of limitations and the provisions of [Rule] 23 regulating 
class actions in the federal courts.”36 Having stated the facts, in Section I the 
Court addressed the status of the members of a certified class for limitations 
purposes. After an account of the history of Rule 23(b)(3), including the 
spurious class action that it replaced, the Court continued: 
Under present Rule 23, however, the difficulties and potential for unfairness 
which, in part, convinced some courts to require individualized satisfaction 
of the statute of limitations by each member of the class, have been 
eliminated, and there remain no conceptual or practical obstacles in the path of 
holding that the filing of a timely class action complaint commences the action for all 
members of the class as subsequently determined. Whatever the merit in the 
conclusion that one seeking to join a class action after the running of the 
statutory period asserts a “separate cause of action” which must individually 
meet the timeliness requirements, such a concept is simply inconsistent with 
Rule 23 as presently drafted. A federal class action is no longer “an invitation 
to joinder” but a truly representative suit designed to avoid, rather than 
encourage, unnecessary filing of repetitious papers and motions. [Before the 
 
34 FED. R. CIV. P. 23 advisory committee’s note to 1966 amendment, quoted supra note 23. 
35 15 U.S.C. §§ 15(b), 16(b) (2012). 
36 Am. Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 540 (1974). 
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court granted class certification],37 the claimed members of the class stood as 
parties to the suit until and unless they received notice thereof and chose not 
to continue.38 
Having explained the functional differences between the spurious class 
action and a class action under amended Rule 23, the Court continued: 
Thus, the commencement of the action satisfied the purpose of the limitation 
provision as to all those who might subsequently participate in the suit as 
well as for the named plaintiffs. To hold to the contrary would frustrate the 
principal function of a class suit because then the sole means by which 
members of the class could assure their participation in the judgment if notice 
of the class suit did not reach them until after the running of the limitation 
period would be to file earlier individual motions to join or intervene as 
parties—precisely the multiplicity of activity which Rule 23 was designed to 
avoid . . . where a class action is found “superior to other available methods 
for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy.”39 
The Court concluded Section I by stating and explaining its view that “no 
different a standard should apply to those members of the class who did not 
rely upon the commencement of the class action (or who were even unaware 
that such a suit existed).”40 The discussion served as a bridge to Section II 
insofar as it expressly referred to situations in which “the order [is] that the suit 
shall or shall not proceed as a class action,”41 the Court deeming potential class 
members “mere passive beneficiaries of the action brought in their behalf”42 
until that decision is made. The Court then ended its discussion of this issue, 
and Section I, by refocusing on certified classes: “Not until the existence and 
limits of the class have been established and notice of membership has been 
sent does a class member have any duty to take . . . responsibility with respect 
to it in order to profit from the eventual outcome of the case.”43 The court 
 
37 We have omitted language that likely has caused some readers not to grasp the opinion’s 
structure. For, in making the point that a certified class action commences the action for all members 
of the class, who “st[an]d as parties to the suit until and unless they receive notice thereof and 
cho[o]se not to continue,” the Court starts with “[u]nder the circumstances of this case, where the 
District Court found that the named plaintiffs asserted claims that were ‘typical of the claims or 
defenses of the class’ and would ‘fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.’” Id. at 550-
51. Of course, in “this case” the class was not certified, and typicality and adequacy of representation 
do not exhaust the requirements for certification. 
38 Id. (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
39 Id. at 551 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
40 Id.  
41 The Court noted that “[i]n the present litigation, the District Court found that only seven 
of the more than 60 intervenors were aware of and relied on the attempted class suit.” Id. at 551 n.21. 
42 Id. at 552. 
43 Id. 
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added that “as to asserted class members who were unaware of the proceedings 
. . . the later running of the applicable statute of limitations does not bar 
participation in the class action and in its ultimate judgment.”44 
The Court began Section II of the opinion by noting that “the District 
Court ordered that the suit could not continue as a class action” and that “the 
participation denied to the respondents because of the running of the 
limitation period was not membership in the class, but rather the privilege of 
intervening in an individual suit.”45 It moved directly to the holding that: 
in this posture, at least where class action status has been denied solely 
because of failure to demonstrate that ‘the class is so numerous that joinder 
of all members is impracticable,’ the commencement of the original class suit 
tolls the running of the statute for all purported members of the class who 
make timely motions to intervene after the court has found the suit 
inappropriate for class action status.”46 
In explaining its holding, the Court observed that “[a] contrary rule 
allowing participation only by those potential members of the class who had 
earlier filed motions to intervene in the suit would deprive Rule 23 class 
actions of the efficiency and economy of litigation which is a principal 
purpose of the procedure,” and that “a rule requiring successful anticipation 
of the determination of the viability of the class would breed needless 
duplication of motions.”47 The Court concluded that “the rule most consistent 
with federal class action procedure must be that the commencement of a class 
action suspends the applicable statute of limitations as to all asserted 
members of the class who would have been parties had the suit been 
permitted to continue as a class action.”48 
The Court then asserted that “[t]his rule is in no way inconsistent with 
the functional operation of a statute of limitations,”49 concluding that, in 
general, a class action tolling rule is consistent with the policies that inform 
limitations law. The conclusion was general both because the Court’s 
limitations policy analysis was not confined to the particular limitations 
statute applicable to the intervenors’ claims,50 and also because the Court left 
room for the lower courts to deny tolling where limitations policies would be 
 
44 Id. 
45 Id. (emphasis added). 
46 Id. at 552-53. 
47 Id. at 553-54. 
48 Id. at 554. In a footnote, the Court quoted the Advisory Committee Note to Rule 23 to the 
effect that the limitations question presented by intervenors following denial of certification is “to 
be decided by reference to the laws governing . . . limitations as they apply in particular contexts.” 
Id. at 554 n.24 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 23 advisory committee’s note to 1966 amendment). 
49 Id. at 554. 
50 See id. 
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subverted, as, for instance when the putative class action did not give a 
defendant fair notice of a claim subsequently brought on an individual basis 
beyond the limitations period.51 
The policies of ensuring essential fairness to defendants and of barring a 
plaintiff who ‘has slept on his rights’ . . . are satisfied when, as here, a named 
plaintiff who is found to be representative of a class commences a suit and 
thereby notifies the defendants not only of the substantive claims being 
brought against them, but also of the number and generic identities of the 
potential plaintiffs who may participate in the judgment. Within the period 
set by the statute of limitations, the defendants have the essential information 
necessary to determine both the subject matter and size of the prospective 
litigation, whether the actual trial is conducted in the form of a class action, 
as a joint suit, or as a principal suit with additional intervenors.52 
Finishing Section II, the Court reasoned that “the tolling rule we establish 
here is consistent with both the procedures of Rule 23 and with the proper 
function of the limitations statute.”53 Although acknowledging “numerous 
and trenchant” criticisms of “Rule 23 and its impact on the federal courts,” 
the Court deemed “this interpretation of the Rule . . . nonetheless necessary 
to insure effectuation of the purposes of litigative efficiency and economy that 
the Rule in its present form was designed to serve.”54 
In Section III the Court took up arguments against the tolling rule it 
adopted, starting with the contention that, “irrespective of the policies 
inherent in Rule 23 and in statutes of limitations,” the federal courts are 
powerless to extend the limitations period set by Congress “because that 
period is a ‘substantive’ element of the right conferred on antitrust plaintiffs 
and cannot be extended by judicial decision or by court rule.”55 Dispatching 
reliance on its decision in The Harrisburg56 because that decision “did not 
purport to define or restrict federal judicial power to delineate [the] 
circumstances where the applicable statute of limitations would be tolled,”57 
 
51 Acknowledging the possibility that defendants might not have notice of the claims against them 
if intervenors could raise issues not presented in the class complaint, the Court noted that the problem 
“will be minimized when, as here, the District Court has already found that the named plaintiffs’ claims 
typify those of the class” and that “under Rule 23(d)(3) ‘the court may make appropriate orders . . . 
imposing conditions on . . . intervenors.’” Id. at 555 n.25. Justice Blackmun’s concurring opinion also 
flagged possible abuse of the Court’s tolling rule, and, for permissive intervention, suggested that 
proper exercise of discretion “might preserve a defendant whole against prejudice arising from claims 
for which he has received no prior notice.” Id. at 562 (Blackmun, J., concurring). 
52 Id. at 554-55. 
53 Id. at 555. 
54 Id. at 555-56. 
55 Id. at 556. 
56 119 U.S. 199 (1886). 
57 American Pipe, 414 U.S. at 557. 
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the Court concluded that the “proper test is not whether a time limitation is 
‘substantive’ or ‘procedural,’ but whether tolling the limitation in a given 
context is consonant with the legislative scheme.”58 
The Court concluded Section III by demonstrating that “[i]n recognizing 
judicial power to toll statutes of limitation in federal courts [it was] not 
breaking new ground.”59 Its primary redoubt for that purpose was Burnett v. 
New York Central Railroad Co.,60 but the Court also referred to cases in which 
“the statutory period [was] tolled or suspended by . . . conduct of the 
defendant”61 involving inducement or fraudulent concealment. According to 
the Court, “the mere fact that a federal statute providing for substantive 
liability also sets a time limitation upon the institution of suit does not restrict 
the power of the federal courts to hold that the statute of limitations is tolled 
under certain circumstances not inconsistent with the legislative purpose.”62 
*      *      * 
Close attention to the operative sections of the Court’s opinion in 
American Pipe makes clear that Rule 23 itself was not the source of the tolling 
rule that emerged from that decision. The Court’s historical review does not 
support the argument that the American Pipe tolling rule is an interpretation 
of Rule 23 in the sense that it is deemed to be prescribed by the Rule.63 That 
history appears in Section I of the opinion, where the Court used the 
problems caused by one-way intervention under the spurious class action to 
explain some lower courts’ refusal to permit tolling, and the changes made in 
1966, resolving those problems, to support the conclusion that “the filing of a 
timely class action complaint commences the action for all members of the 
class as subsequently determined.”64 
Turning to Section II of the opinion, if Rule 23 could be interpreted directly 
to prescribe a tolling rule, it should not have been necessary to engage in the 
policy analysis that dominated the Court’s discussion. The sentence beginning 
“We are convinced that the rule most consistent with federal class action 
procedure must be”65 is simply no way to interpret a Federal Rule as the source 
 
58 Id. at 557-58 (footnote omitted). 
59 Id. at 558. 
60 380 U.S. 424 (1965). 
61 American Pipe, 414 U.S. at 559. 
62 Id. 
63 But see Chardon v. Fumero Soto, 462 U.S. 650, 664-65 (1983) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) 
(“[T]he source of the tolling rule applied by the Court was necessarily Rule 23. Any doubt as to this 
fact is removed by the Court’s lengthy discussion of the history, purposes, and intent of the rule.”); 
infra text accompanying note 128. 
64 American Pipe, 414 U.S. at 550. 
65 Id. at 554. 
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of a legal prescription, even acknowledging that, by analogy, statutory 
interpretation and federal common law are different in degree, not in kind.66 
Still harder to view as an interpretation of Rule 23 in that sense is the Court’s 
reference to “the tolling rule we establish here.”67 That’s 1974, not 1966. Given 
all of this, one can forgive the Court for its imprecise reference in the same 
paragraph to “this interpretation of the Rule,”68 which must be read in context. 
In a footnote in Section III, the Court referred to its “conclusion that a 
judicial tolling of the statute of limitations does not abridge or modify a 
substantive right afforded by the antitrust acts.”69 The language used might 
be deemed relevant because it is reminiscent of the limitations on rulemaking 
under the REA.70 It should be recalled, however, that in this part of the 
opinion the Court was responding to the contention that the Clayton Act’s 
limitation period was “a ‘substantive’ element of the right conferred on 
antitrust plaintiffs and cannot be extended or restricted by judicial decision or 
by court rule.”71 The petitioners’ reliance on The Harrisburg was central to that 
argument. Having discussed that case, the Court stated: “But the Court in 
The Harrisburg did not purport to define or restrict federal judicial power to 
delineate circumstances where the applicable statute of limitations would be 
tolled.”72 Moreover, application of a Federal Rule cannot properly be 
described as “judicial tolling,” and a decision “recognizing judicial power to 
toll statutes of limitation in federal courts” is not a decision relying directly 
on Rule 23, which is an exercise of delegated legislative, not Article III 
judicial, power.73 Finally, it is doubtful that Rule 23 could validly prescribe a 
 
66 See Peter Westen & Jeffrey S. Lehman, Is There Life for Erie After the Death of Diversity?, 78 
MICH. L. REV. 311, 332 (1980) (“The difference between ‘common law’ and ‘statutory interpretation’ 
is a difference in emphasis rather than a difference in kind.”). 
67 American Pipe, 414 U.S. at 555. 
68 Id. 
69 Id. at 558 n.29. 
70 See 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (2012) (“Such rules shall not abridge, enlarge, or modify any 
substantive right.”). Changes in the REA since 1974 are not material for this purpose. 
71 American Pipe, 414 U.S. at 556 (emphasis added). “The Court was not persuaded by the 
attempt of the petitioners in American Pipe to measure the Court’s power to make law ‘by judicial 
decision’ according to its power to make law by ‘court rule.’” Burbank, Hold the Corks, supra note 25, 
at 1028. See also China Agritech, Inc. v. Resh, 138 S. Ct. 1800, 1810 (2018) (“Plaintiffs have no 
substantive right to bring their claims outside the statute of limitations. That they may do so, in 
limited circumstances, is due to a judicially crafted tolling rule that itself does not abridge, enlarge, 
or modify any substantive right.”) (citing American Pipe, 414 U.S. at 558). But see Mitchell A. 
Lowenthal & Normal Menachim Feder, The Impropriety of Class Action Tolling for Mass Tort Statutes 
of Limitations, 64 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 532, 548 (1996) (failing to note that the argument to which 
the Court responded pertained to both judicial decisions and court rules). 
72 American Pipe, 414 U.S. at 557. 
73 See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 386 n.14 (1989) (stating that “rulemaking power 
originates in the Legislative Branch”); Stephen B. Burbank, Procedure, Politics and Power: The Role of 
Congress, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1677, 1683 (2004) [hereinafter Role of Congress]. 
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tolling rule under the REA—for statutes of limitations or statutes of 
repose74—and if it could, the Act’s supersession clause75 would render concern 
about consistency with antecedent statutory limitations periods, such as that 
contained in the Clayton Act, unnecessary. 
To be sure, the Court may have exhibited some confusion about the source of 
the tolling rule it was creating in American Pipe, not always distinguishing between 
the direct impact of Rule 23 and the independent role of the federal courts in 
ensuring that important federal policies are carried into effect. Interweaving the 
language of judicial lawmaking and the language of Rule interpretation was not 
deft.76 But the better reading, which is confirmed by subsequent decisions, is that 
the Court crafted the American Pipe tolling rule as federal common law and that 
its reference to “this interpretation of the Rule” describes its inquiry into the 
policies associated with Rule 23, not its direct mandate. 
Thus, the CalPERS Court was correct that American Pipe cannot properly 
be read to mean “that the tolling rule it created was mandated by the text of 
a statute or federal rule,”77 and lower courts whose invocation of “legal tolling” 
or “statutory tolling” reflects attribution of the rule directly to Rule 23 have 
been mistaken.78 It is equally clear, however, that the CalPERS Court was not 
correct in asserting that “the Court’s holding [in American Pipe] was instead 
grounded in the traditional equitable powers of the judiciary.”79 Indeed, the 
implausibility of the assertion is revealed by the first sentence of the opinion 
in American Pipe: “This case involves an aspect of the relationship between a 
statute of limitations and the provisions of [Rule] 23 regulating class actions 
 
74 See, e.g., Burbank, Hold the Corks, supra note 25, at 1027-28. 
75 See 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (2012) (“All laws in conflict with such rules shall be of no further force or 
effect after such rules have taken effect.”). Changes in the REA since 1974 are not material for this purpose. 
76 Among those who appear to have been misled was the petitioner in CalPERS. See Brief of 
Petitioner at 8, 13-14, 48-51, Cal. Pub. Emps.’ Ret. Sys. v. ANZ Secs., Inc., 137 S. Ct. 2042 (2017) 
(No. 16-373) (treating American Pipe tolling as prescribed by Rule 23 and arguing that, so viewed, it 
is valid under the REA). In fairness, however, the petitioner was seeking to refute, without 
questioning the premises of, the Second Circuit’s analysis “that even if American Pipe tolling is 
derived from Rule 23, and therefore ‘legal’ rather than ‘equitable,’ it cannot be used to toll a statute 
of repose because the Rules Enabling Act would prohibit that result.” Id. at 48. 
77 CalPERS, 137 S. Ct. at 2051-52. 
78 See, e.g., Stone Container Corp. v. United States, 229 F.3d 1345, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2000) 
(“statutory”); Arivella v. Lucent Techs., Inc., 623 F. Supp. 2d 164, 176 (D. Mass. 2009) (“legal” but 
with a “statutory source”), discussed infra text accompanying notes 151–158. In Joseph v. Wiles, 223 
F.3d 1155, 1167 (10th Cir. 2000), the court characterized American Pipe tolling as “legal” rather than 
“equitable,” but it also recognized that, rather than being prescribed by Rule 23, the tolling doctrine 
serves its purposes. See id. at 1167. 
79 CalPERS, 137 S. Ct. at 2052. There is simply nothing in the Court’s summary of the reasoning in 
American Pipe that supports its assertion immediately following that summary: “As this discussion 
indicates, the source of the tolling rule in American Pipe is the judicial power to promote equity.” Id. at 2051. 
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in the federal courts.”80 The class action may be a child of equity, but “the 
provisions of [Rule] 23” cannot be taken as synonymous with “traditional 
equitable powers of the judiciary.” 
In the limitations context, the “traditional equitable powers of the 
judiciary” are salient in situations where the facts of a case would render it 
inequitable to apply the pertinent law. The underlying concerns of equity in 
that context relate to the effect of limitations law on parties.81 In American 
Pipe, by contrast, the Court crafted a tolling rule in order to protect Rule 23 
policies that serve primarily institutional interests—“the efficiency and 
economy of litigation which is a principal purpose of the procedure.”82 That 
the main focus was institutional is also signaled by the Court’s conclusion that 
its tolling rule is available whether or not absent members of a putative class 
relied on the filing of the action or were even aware of it.83 
Contrary to the suggestion in CalPERS,84 the American Pipe Court’s 
discussion of cases in which equitable considerations had been invoked to 
justify limitations tolling does not mean that it was relying on such 
considerations as the basis for its tolling rule. Indeed, in a 1975 decision 
distinguishing American Pipe and the primary precedent on which it had 
relied in that discussion, Burnett v. New York Central Railroad Co.,85 the Court 
observed: 
Neither case is helpful. The respective periods of limitation in those cases 
were derived directly from federal statutes rather than by reference to state 
law. Moreover, in each case there was a substantial body of relevant federal 
procedural law to guide the decision to toll the limitation period, and 
 
80 Am. Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 540 (1974); see also Albano v. Shea Homes 
Ltd. P’ship, 227 Ariz. 121, 127 (2011) (“American Pipe tolling is a court-created rule based on policy 
considerations and principles underlying Rule 23.”). 
81 ”Generally, a litigant seeking equitable tolling bears the burden of establishing two elements: 
(1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance 
stood in his way.” Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418 (2005). 
82 414 U.S. at 453. 
83 See supra text accompanying note 40. Having observed that “[t]olling may be of great value 
to allow injured persons to recover for injuries” that they did not discover “through no fault of their 
own,” the CalPERS Court reasoned that “[i]n a similar way, tolling as allowed in American Pipe may 
protect plaintiffs who anticipated their interests would be protected by a class action but later learned 
that a class suit could not be maintained for reasons outside their control.” 137 S. Ct. at 2055. This 
may be true, but, not being founded in equity, the rule does not require reliance on, or even 
awareness, of the putative class action. See State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co. v. Boellstroff, 540 F.3d 
1223, 1234 (10th Cir. 2008) (“[T]he American Pipe and Crown decisions highlight the fact that reliance 
or even awareness of the class action are irrelevant. In this vein, we have concluded that American 
Pipe tolling is ‘legal rather than equitable in nature. . . .’”). 
84 “The Court also relied on cases that are paradigm applications of equitable tolling principles, 
explaining with approval that tolling in one such case was based on considerations deeply rooted in 
our jurisprudence.” 137 S. Ct. at 2052 (internal quotations omitted). 
85 380 U.S. 424 (1965). 
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significant underlying federal policy that would have conflicted with a 
decision not to suspend the running of the statute.86 
Rather, the cases were cited in support of the conclusion that “the mere 
fact that a federal statute providing for substantive liability also sets a time 
limitation upon the institution of suit does not restrict the power of the 
federal courts to hold that the statute of limitations is tolled under certain 
circumstances not inconsistent with the legislative purpose.”87 
Contrary to the treatment of this question in CalPERS and some passages 
in Resh, none of the Court’s reasoning in American Pipe “reveals a rule based 
on traditional equitable powers, designed to modify a statutory time bar 
where its rigid application would create injustice.”88 As we demonstrate in 
Part II, “traditional equitable powers” do not exhaust judicial power to 
fashion rules that are required for the protection of existing federal law. The 
source of American Pipe tolling is federal common law. Although “Rule 23 
does not and could not validly provide a tolling rule, in devising such a rule 
‘not inconsistent with the legislative purpose,’ the Court was not required to 
ignore the policies exogenous to limitations that animate Rule 23, including 
in particular the policy against ‘multiplicity of activity.’”89 
B. Crown, Cork & Seal (and Eisen): Individual Actions and Certified Classes 
The Court’s holding in Section II of American Pipe was limited to the facts 
of the case and thus to situations in which, certification having been denied, 
a putative class member seeks to intervene beyond the limitations period.90 
 
86 Johnson v. Ry. Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454, 466 (1975). In a footnote, the Court 
briefly described Burnett and American Pipe, observing with respect to the latter: “In the light of the 
history of [Rule] 23 and the purposes of litigatory efficiency served by class actions, we concluded 
that the prior filing had a tolling effect.” Id. at 467 n.12. 
87 American Pipe, 414 U.S. at 559. 
88 CalPERS, 137 S. Ct. at 2052. 
89 Burbank, Hold the Corks, supra note 25, at 1027-28 (footnotes omitted). See also Stephen B. 
Burbank, Interjurisdictional Preclusion, Full Faith and Credit and Federal Common Law: A General 
Approach, 71 CORNELL L. REV. 733, 773-74 (1986) [hereinafter Interjurisdictional Preclusion] (“Because 
Federal Rules cannot validly provide for the creation of federal common law . . . they are sources of 
power only if, fairly read, they may be said to require it.”); Burbank & Wolff, Redeeming the Missed 
Opportunities, supra note 32, at 50 (“[T]he application of Rule 23 in those proceedings was the occasion 
for the Court to implement class action policies in federal common law that it was otherwise 
authorized to make.”). For others who have followed us in reaching this conclusion, if not our 
conclusions about the reach and limits of the federal common-law rule, see Wendy Gerwick Couture, 
Class-Action Tolling, Federal Common Law, and Securities Statutes of Repose: A Recommendation, 46 LOY. 
U. CHI. L.J. 525, 540-43 (2015); Lowenthal & Feder, supra note 71, at 549, 556; see also Rhonda 
Wasserman, Tolling, The American Pipe Tolling Rule and Successive Class Actions, 58 FLA. L. REV. 803, 
825 (2006). 
90 As we have seen, however, the Court evidently deemed necessary to that holding the resolution, 
in Section I of the opinion, of the status for limitations purposes of the members of a certified class. 
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The main reasons given for its holding, however, are also applicable where, 
rather than intervene in the original action, the individual prefers an 
independent action over a motion to intervene.91 The Court so held, 
explicitly, in Crown, Cork & Seal Co. v. Parker.92 In addition, the Court 
implicitly resolved the question whether American Pipe tolling extends to 
situations in which class certification is denied for reasons other than, or in 
addition to, lack of numerosity. 
The District Court’s additional reasons for denying certification in Crown, 
Cork & Seal were that the claims of the named plaintiffs were not typical of 
the claims of the class and that the named plaintiffs were not adequate 
representatives, both of which findings might have been thought to affect the 
applicability of the tolling rule in American Pipe.93 We infer from the Court’s 
inattention to that aspect of the case that the justices had come to understand 
the incongruity of such an ex post inquiry as part of a rule that was designed 
to prevent the risk aversion of absent members of a putative class from 
defeating central purposes of Rule 23. 
Instead of relying categorically on the reasons why certification was 
denied, the Court appears to have opted to focus on a comparison of claims 
actually made in order to determine whether a defendant had fair and timely 
notice for limitations purposes.94 Recalling Justice Blackmun’s concurring 
opinion in American Pipe, Justice Powell stressed the potential “abuse” that 
would follow if American Pipe tolling were “read . . . as leaving a plaintiff free 
to raise different or peripheral claims following denial of class status.”95 He 
also concluded, however, that “it is indisputable that the Pendleton class suit 
notified petitioner of respondent’s claims. The statute of limitations therefore 
was tolled under American Pipe as to those claims.”96 
    *      *      * 
In its 1983 ruling in Crown, Cork & Seal, the Court viewed American Pipe 
tolling as an exercise of judicial power, rather than the result of a rule imposed 
directly by Rule 23, and there is no hint of “a rule based on traditional 
 
91 This is not to say that the two situations are identical. As we discuss below, individual actions 
raise issues of governing law that are not presented by intervention in the original action. 
92 462 U.S. 345, 349-51 (1983). Like American Pipe, Crown, Cork & Seal involved suit under a 
federal statute (Title VII) that contained its own limitations provision. 
93 See supra text accompanying note 46 (quoting language potentially confining the Court’s holding 
to situations where certification is denied for lack of numerosity); see also supra note 37 (quoting language 
suggesting importance of findings of typicality and adequate representation). 
94 The Court noted that it was “undisputed that respondent was a member of the asserted 
class.” Crown, Cork & Seal, 462 U.S. at 347. 
95 Id. at 354 (Powell, J., concurring). 
96 Id. at 355. 
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equitable powers, designed to modify a statutory time bar where its rigid 
application would create injustice.”97  
The Court [in American Pipe] reasoned that unless the filing of a class action 
tolled the statute of limitations, potential class members would be induced to 
file motions to intervene or to join in order to protect themselves against the 
possibility that certification would be denied. The principal purposes of the class 
action procedure—promotion of efficiency and economy of litigation—would 
thereby be frustrated. To protect the policies behind the class action procedure, 
the Court held that “the commencement of a class action suspends the applicable 
statute of limitations as to all asserted members of the class who would have been 
parties had the suit been permitted to continue as a class action.”98 
Moreover, Crown, Cork & Seal surfaced another powerful argument in favor 
of American Pipe tolling. In a footnote in Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin,99 less than 
five months after American Pipe was decided, the Court explained why, contrary 
to the petitioner’s argument, individual notice to members of a certified class 
who could be identified with reasonable effort would not be futile after the 
limitations period had expired. The Eisen Court observed that American Pipe 
“established that commencement of a class action tolls the applicable statute of 
limitations as to all members of the class.”100 Although seemingly dictum, the 
statement reflected the result logically entailed by Section I of American Pipe, 
which the Court in that case evidently considered essential to its holding in 
Section II.101 The Court’s reasoning in Eisen provided an additional reason for 
the Crown, Cork & Seal Court not to confine tolling to intervenors. In the 
process, however, it also raised the stakes of determining the source of the rule, 
its source of authority, and the limits of judicial power: 
If American Pipe’s tolling rule applies only to intervenors, this reference to 
American Pipe is misplaced and makes no sense. Eisen’s notice requirement 
was intended to inform the class member that he could “preserve his 
opportunity to press his claim separately” by opting out of the class. But a 
class member would be unable to “press his claim separately” if the 
 
97 Cal. Pub. Emps.’ Ret. Sys. v. ANZ Secs., Inc., 137 S. Ct. 2042,  2052 (2017). 
98 Crown, Cork, & Seal, 462 U.S. at 349 (citation omitted). See id. at 351 (“The result would be 
a needless multiplicity of actions—precisely the situation that [Rule 23] and the tolling rule of 
American Pipe were designed to avoid.”). 
99 417 U.S. 156 (1974). 
100 Id. at 176 n.13. 
101 Professor Couture contends that “in Eisen, the Court summarily extended the reach of 
American Pipe tolling, without discussing the purposes of Rule 23.” Couture, supra note 89, at 542. 
She neglects the structure of the opinion in American Pipe, Section I of which concerned the 
members of certified classes and did discuss Rule 23’s purposes and policies. See supra text 
accompanying notes 35–62; supra note 90; infra text accompanying note 141. 
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limitations period had expired while the class action was pending. The Eisen 
Court recognized this difficulty but concluded that the right to opt out and 
press a separate claim remained meaningful because the filing of the class 
action tolled the statute of limitations under the rule of American Pipe. If 
American Pipe were limited to intervenors, it would not serve the purpose 
assigned to it by Eisen; no class member would opt out simply to intervene. 
Thus, the Eisen Court necessarily read American Pipe as we read it today, to 
apply to class members who choose to file separate suits.102 
C. Chardon: Accommodating the Specific Requirements of Section 1988 
In Chardon v. Fumero Soto,103 decided one week after Crown, Cork & Seal, 
the Court for the first time considered the application of American Pipe tolling 
in a case where the federal statute affording the claim did not also prescribe 
a limitations period. Moreover, because the putative class action was brought 
under section 1983, it was governed by section 1988, 104 which is “a statute 
similar to the Rules of Decision Act but more narrowly focused and hence 
not as easy to ignore or wish away.”105 
At issue in the case was the timeliness of individual actions brought by 
unnamed members of a putative section 1983 class action after certification 
was denied. The answer turned on whether the tolling effect was governed by 
the law of Puerto Rico, in which event they were timely, or a uniform federal 
rule, in which event they were filed too late. The Court of Appeals had held 
that class action tolling was available under Puerto Rican law and that the 
Puerto Rican courts would apply a tolling rule that provided for renewal of 
the limitations period upon denial of certification rather than, as in American 
Pipe, suspension upon filing of the putative class action. 
 
102 Crown, Cork & Seal, 462 U.S. at 351-52 (citations omitted). 
103 462 U.S. 650 (1983). 
104 Section 1988 provides in pertinent part: 
The jurisdiction in [designated civil and criminal civil rights cases] shall be exercised 
and enforced in conformity with the laws of the United States, so far as such laws are 
suitable to carry the same into effect; but in all cases where they are not adapted to 
the object, or are deficient in the provisions necessary to furnish suitable remedies and 
punish offenses against law, the common law, as modified and changed by the 
constitution and statutes of the State wherein the court having jurisdiction of such 
civil or criminal cause is held, so far as the same is not inconsistent with the 
Constitution and laws of the United States, shall be extended to and govern the said 
courts in the trial and disposition of the cause, and, if it is of a criminal nature, in the 
infliction of punishment on the party found guilty. 
42 U.S.C. § 1988(a) (2012). 
105 Stephen B. Burbank, Of Rules and Discretion: The Supreme Court, Federal Rules and Common 
Law, 63 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 693, 705 (1988) [hereinafter Of Rules and Discretion]. 
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The Supreme Court distinguished American Pipe on the ground that there 
“federal law defined the basic limitations period, federal procedural policies 
supported [tolling] during the pendency of the class action, and a particular 
federal statute provided the basis for deciding that the tolling had the effect 
of suspending the limitations period. No question of state law was 
presented.”106 The Court continued: 
In a § 1983 action, however, Congress has specifically directed the courts, in 
the absence of controlling federal law, to apply state statutes of limitations 
and state tolling rules unless they are “inconsistent with the Constitution and 
laws of the United States.” American Pipe does not answer the question 
whether, in a §1983 case in which the filing of a class action has tolled the 
statute of limitations until class certification is denied, the tolling effect is 
suspension rather than renewal or extension of the period. American Pipe 
simply asserts a federal interest in assuring the efficiency and economy of the class 
action procedure. After class certification is denied, that federal interest is 
vindicated as long as each unnamed plaintiff is given as much time to 
intervene or file a separate action as he would have under a state savings 
statute applicable to a party whose action has been dismissed for reasons 
unrelated to the merits, or, in the absence of a statute, the time provided 
under the most closely analogous state tolling statute.107 
Noting agreement among the parties and the Court of Appeals that tolling 
applied, the Court held that the federal interest asserted in American Pipe was 
vindicated by “the Puerto Rican rule that, after tolling comes to an end, the 
statute of limitations begins to run anew.”108 Key to its analysis for purposes 
of section 1988 was the view that, whatever the status of class action tolling 
under American Pipe,109 the tolling effect prescribed in that case was fashioned 
by analogy to provisions of the Clayton Act and did not itself constitute “an 
established federal rule of decision . . . making resort to state law 
unnecessary.”110 Disagreement on that question prompted a dissenting 
opinion by Justice Rehnquist (joined by Justices Powell and White). 
The dissent argued that “the decision [in American Pipe] recognizes a 
federal rule of tolling applicable to class actions brought under [Rule] 23, and 
 
106 Chardon, 462 U.S. at 660-61. 
107 Id. at 661 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted) (citation omitted). 
108 Id. “Since the application of this state-law rule gives unnamed class members the same 
protection as if they had filed actions in their own names which were subsequently dismissed, the 
federal interest set forth in American Pipe is fully protected.” Id. 
109 ”Petitioners, respondents, and the Court of Appeals all agree that the statute of limitations 
was tolled . . . . We must examine the reasoning of American Pipe, however, to determine whether 
that decision embodies the second requirement that petitioners urge us to recognize [a uniform 
federal rule of suspension].” Id. at 658. 
110 Id. 
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that this rule is made applicable by § 1988 to claims brought under § 1983.”111 
Reasoning that, because the Clayton Act did not address the question and the 
Court made no reference to state law, “the source of the tolling rule applied 
by the Court was necessarily Rule 23,”112 the dissent maintained that, “[i]n 
interpreting Rule 23 to contain a [tolling rule], the Court also addressed the 
more general question of [tolling effect],”113 and that in so doing “it was 
fashioning a general federal tolling rule grounded on Rule 23.”114 Thus, with 
reference to section 1988, unlike the situation in Board of Regents of University 
of State of New York v. Tomanio,115 where there was “a void in federal statutory 
law,”116 “[o]wing to American Pipe and its interpretation of Rule 23, there is no 
comparable void in this case.”117 In support of that view, the dissent contended 
that the Court’s failure to hold “that Rule 23 reflects a uniform tolling rule 
. . . encourages needless litigation regarding what state tolling rule applies,”118 
and that “[f]ew areas of the law stand in greater need of firmly defined, easily 
applied rules than does the subject of periods of limitations.”119 
*      *      * 
The Court in Chardon did not need to decide whether American Pipe’s 
tolling rule applied, because the parties and the Court of Appeals agreed that 
there would be class action tolling as a matter of Puerto Rican law. Thus, in 
the Court’s view, the only question was whether, in a case governed by section 
1988, the tolling effect prescribed in American Pipe (suspension) or the tolling 
effect prescribed by Puerto Rican law for analogous cases (renewal) was 
applicable. That said, if state law had called for no tolling at all, it is apparent 
that the Court would have required that state law be displaced.120 As put by 
the dissent, “[i]f the law of a particular State was that the pendency of a class 
action did not toll the statute of limitations as to unnamed class members, 
 
111 Id. at 663-64 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
112 Id. at 664. 
113 Id. at 665. 
114 Id. 
115 446 U.S. 478 (1980). 
116 Chardon, 462 U.S. at 666 n.1 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (quoting Tomanio, 446 U.S. at 483). 
117 Id. 
118 Id. at 667. 
119 Id. 
120 See id. at 661 (majority opinion) (“After class certification is denied, that federal interest is 
vindicated as long as each unnamed plaintiff is given as much time to intervene or file a separate 
action . . . .”); id. at 661 (“[T]he federal interest set forth in American Pipe is fully protected”); id. at 
661 n.15 (discussing, by contrast, hypothetical Puerto Rican rule that would give an unnamed class 
member “an incentive to protect his interests by creating the very multiplicity and needless 
duplication against which the Court warned in American Pipe”). 
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there seems little question but that the federal rule of American Pipe would 
nonetheless be applicable.”121 
There is language in the Court’s opinion in Chardon suggesting that 
American Pipe’s tolling rule was an interpretation of Rule 23, but it occurs in 
the Court’s summary of the Court of Appeals’ opinion, and, as is often true, 
the meaning of “interpretation” is ambiguous.122 Elsewhere, the Court refers 
to “the common-law rule of suspension.”123 There is no suggestion in the 
Court’s description of American Pipe that it viewed that case as imputing the 
basic tolling rule, let alone the prescribed tolling effect, directly to Rule 23, 
which may have been the view taken by the dissenting justices. There is also 
no hint of “equitable tolling” in the Court’s discussion of American Pipe,124 
which is not surprising given the Court’s description of that case as one where 
“federal procedural policies supported the tolling of the statute during the 
pendency of the class action”125 and as “assert[ing] a federal interest in 
assuring the efficiency and economy of the class-action procedure.”126 
The dissent’s basic argument was that American Pipe established uniform 
federal law rendering resort to state law unnecessary under section 1988, and 
that it did so as an interpretation of Rule 23. The dissenting justices may have 
viewed Rule 23 as the source of the rule in American Pipe.127 If so, as previously 
discussed, the American Pipe Court’s discussion of the history of Rule 23 does 
not provide the support that the dissenters claimed for this view.128 Moreover, 
as we have noted, it is a view that is difficult to reconcile with the limitations 
in the REA and, if that barrier were surmounted, one that, by reason of the 
supersession clause, would render the attention paid to statutory limitations 
policy in American Pipe superfluous.129 Finally, since Rule 23 governs only in 
federal courts, this view of American Pipe would render the federal courts 
powerless to protect their institutional interests, or the interests of the 
members of certified classes who opt out, against subversion in subsequent 
state court proceedings. 
 
121 Id. at 667 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
122 See id. at 654 (majority opinion) (describing Court of Appeals opinion as noting that “this 
Court had interpreted the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to permit” tolling). 
123 Id. at 655. 
124 But see Reno v. Catholic Soc. Servs., 509 U.S. 43, 82 (1993) (Stevens, J., dissenting) 
(including American Pipe in a string citation with a parenthetical stating “equitable relief must be 
‘consonant with the legislative scheme’”). 
125 Chardon, 462 U.S. at 660-61. 
126 Id. at 661. 
127 See id. at 664-65 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (“[T]he source of the tolling rule applied by the 
Court was necessarily Rule 23. Any doubt as to this fact is removed by the Court’s lengthy discussion 
of the history, purposes, and intent of the Rule.”); id. at 665 (“In interpreting Rule 23 to contain a 
rule . . . .”) (emphasis added). 
128 See supra text accompanying notes 63–64. 
129 See supra text accompanying notes 74–75. 
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Perhaps, however, this account of Justice Rehnquist’s dissent is too literal. 
Perhaps, that is, the dissenting justices did not clearly distinguish between 
sources of federal rules and sources of authority for those rules, did not clearly 
distinguish between interpretation and judicial lawmaking, and did not 
intend to assimilate a judge-made rule directly to a Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure whose provisions and policies it was designed to protect. Indeed, 
this alternative account also finds considerable support in the dissent in 
Chardon. Thus, in the sentence following that in which it described American 
Pipe as “[i]nterpreting Rule 23 to contain a rule,”130 the dissent described the 
Court in that case as “fashioning a general federal tolling rule grounded on 
Rule 23.”131 Moreover, Justice Rehnquist’s opinion elsewhere referred to “the 
federal rule under Rule 23;”132 it observed that “in areas aside from class 
actions, the Court has recognized that federal tolling rules apply to state 
statutes of limitations,”133 and it asserted a “claim that Rule 23 reflects a 
uniform tolling rule.”134 
Whatever the position of the dissenting Justices in Chardon as to the 
source of the rule in American Pipe, the questions they raised about the costs 
imposed by the Court’s interpretation require attention not just in the context 
of cases governed by section 1988, but also in other contexts where state law 
may be pertinent. We address them in Part III.B.4.135 
D. Post-Chardon Cases: The Hazards of String Citations 
After Chardon was decided, and prior to CalPERS, the Court was not again 
called on seriously to engage American Pipe in order to determine the source of 
the tolling rule in that case. Instead, during this period American Pipe served 
mostly as fodder for string citations and brief descriptions.136 Although 
hopelessly inconsistent as a group, among them the brief descriptions come 
closer than the string citations to the true source of American Pipe tolling. 
In Young v. United States,137 the Court included American Pipe in a “see also” 
string citation for the proposition that “[i]t is hornbook law that limitations 
periods are ‘customarily subject to ‘equitable tolling,’ . . . unless tolling would 
 
130 Chardon, 462 U.S. at 665 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
131 Id. 
132 Id. at 666. 
133 Id. at 666-67. The Court supported this proposition as follows: “See, e.g., Holmberg v. 
Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392 . . . (1946) (general federal principles of equity must be applied by federal 
courts in actions involving federal claims, even where state statutes of limitations are borrowed).” 
134 Id. at 667. 
135 See infra text accompanying notes 261–277. 
136 We omit from the cases discussed below Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 
454 (1975), which is discussed supra text accompanying note 86. 
137 535 U.S. 43 (2002). 
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be ‘inconsistent with the text of the relevant statute.‘”138 Of course, and again, 
American Pipe itself contains scant evidence that the Court relied on 
“equitable tolling” and a great deal of evidence that it did not. 
In Irwin v. Department of Veteran Affairs,139 the Court included American 
Pipe in a string citation designed to support the proposition that “[w]e have 
allowed equitable tolling in situations where the claimant has actively pursued 
his judicial remedies by filing a defective pleading during a statutory 
period,”140 appending the parenthetical “(plaintiff ’s timely filing of a defective 
class action tolled the limitations period as to individual claims of purported 
class members).”141 Unfortunately, the Court did not seem to recognize either 
that American Pipe’s treatment of the status of members of a certified (i.e., 
non-defective) class for limitations purposes in Section I of the opinion was 
integral to its holding in Section II, or that, for this reason, the footnote in 
Eisen, confirming that they are entitled to a toll upon opting out, was a 
foregone conclusion. In addition, the parenthetical neglects the American Pipe 
Court’s conclusion that tolling was available to people who did not rely on, 
including those who were unaware of, the filing of the putative class action. 
In Devlin v. Scardelletti,142 the Court cited American Pipe for the 
proposition that “[n]onnamed class members are . . . parties . . . in the sense 
that the filing of an action on behalf of the class tolls a statute of limitations 
against them.”143 Far from attributing the rule to “equitable tolling,” however, 
the Court observed that “[o]therwise, all class members would be forced to 
intervene to preserve their claims, and one of the major goals of class action 
litigation—to simplify litigation involving a large number of class members 
with similar claims—would be defeated.”144 
In Smith v. Bayer Corp.,145 the respondent invoked American Pipe and 
another case in support of the argument that an absent member of a putative 
class should be treated as a party for preclusion purposes. The Court 
responded that “these cases, which were specifically grounded in policies of 
judicial administration, demonstrate only that a person who is not a party to 
a class suit may receive certain benefits (such as the tolling of a limitations 
period) related to that proceeding.”146 “[P]olicies of judicial administration” 
is not an obvious synonym for “general federal principles of equity.”147 
 
138 Id. at 49. 
139 498 U.S. 89 (1990). 
140 Id. at 96. 
141 Id. at 96 n.3. 
142 536 U.S. 1 (2002). 
143 Id. at 10. 
144 Id. 
145 564 U.S. 299 (2011). 
146 Id. at 313 n.10. 
147 See supra note 133 and accompanying text. 
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In Credit Suisse Securities (USA) LLC v. Simmonds,148 the respondent relied 
on American Pipe in support of the argument that the tolling rule applied in a 
Ninth Circuit decision “is best understood as applying legal—rather than 
equitable—tolling.”149 The Court responded:  
We based our conclusion [in American Pipe] on “the efficiency and economy 
of litigation which is a principal purpose of [Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 23 class 
actions].” Although we did not employ the term “legal tolling,” some federal 
courts have used that term to describe our holding on the ground that the 
rule “is derived from a statutory source,” whereas equitable tolling is 
“judicially created.” Arviella v. Lucent Technologies, Inc., 623 F. Supp. 2d 164, 
176 (D. Mass. 2009). The label attached to the [Ninth Circuit] rule does not 
matter. As we proceed to explain, neither general equitable-tolling principles 
nor the statutory source of § 16 supports the conclusion that the limitations 
period is tolled until the filing of a § 16(a) statement.150 
Indeed, labels should not matter, but the Court’s reference to Judge Young’s 
decision in Arivella is misleading, deflecting attention from the fact that the 
“statutory source” to which he was referring was Rule 23, not the substantive 
statute that grounded the claims in question. In Arivella, the court explained 
that “American Pipe tolling ‘is a species of legal tolling,’ [because] it is derived 
from a statutory source, in this case Rule 23.”151 The court then went on to 
explain that “[l]egal tolling is . . . distinct from equitable tolling, which is a 
judicially created doctrine that stops the running of a statute of limitations in 
certain situations involving unfairness or excusable mistake.”152 
It is clear that, although describing American Pipe as “derived from a 
statutory source, in this case Rule 23,” the Arivella court understood that Rule 
23 was not the source of the tolling rule in the sense that, for example, it is 
the source of the rule requiring an opportunity to opt out of 23(b)(3) class 
actions.153 Thus, the operative significance of that court’s distinction between 
“legal tolling” and “equitable tolling” is not that only one of them is judicially 
fashioned. It is rather that one of them is fashioned to serve general, 
“judicially created” principles of equity jurisprudence,154 while the other is 
 
148 566 U.S. 221 (2012). 
149 Id. at 226 n.6. 
150 Id. (citations omitted). 
151 623 F. Supp.2d 164, 176 (D. Mass. 2009) (citation omitted). 
152 Id. at 176 (citation omitted). 
153 See id. at 173-78. Apart from quotations from American Pipe that demonstrate this 
understanding, the court referred to Crown, Cork & Seal as a decision in which “the Court expanded 
the American Pipe tolling rule.” Id. at 174. 
154 Having stated the proposition of hornbook law about equitable tolling that is quoted above in 
the text at note 138, the Court in Young continued: “Congress must be presumed to draft limitations 
periods in light of this background principle. That is doubly true when it is enacting limitations periods 
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fashioned in the service of “federal policies demonstrably rooted in sources 
of unquestioned validity.”155 The Arivella court undoubtedly also understood 
that “[p]lainly the Rules are not acts of Congress.”156 Perhaps, however, it 
disagreed that they “can not be treated as such”157 for all purposes. Perhaps, 
like the Constitution and federal statutes, Federal Rules can properly be 
treated as a source of authority for federal common law because they are 
promulgated under the authority of the REA, which represents “Congress’ 
attempt to exercise” the “Constitution’s grant of power over federal 
procedure.”158 We pursue that question further in Part II. 
Finally, in Menominee Indian Tribe v. United States,159 the Court appeared 
to accept the Tribe’s distinction between “class-action tolling,” for which it 
cited American Pipe, and “equitable tolling,”160 but the Court discussed only 
the latter because the Tribe was not eligible for the former. As a result, the 
decision deserves no greater weight than occasional references to American 
Pipe as an example of “equitable tolling,” such as those discussed above and 
relied upon by the Court in CalPERS.161 All such references are essentially 
useless in the search for the source of the rule and its source of authority. 
II. AMERICAN PIPE TOLLING: SOURCE OF AUTHORITY 
 Our conclusion that the American Pipe rule constitutes an exercise of 
federal common law requires both specification and explanation. The term 
“federal common law” encompasses several varieties of federal judicial 
lawmaking, and the failure of courts and commentators to describe them with 
precision accounts for some of the lack of clarity that has characterized 
discussions of American Pipe. The Court’s references to “the equitable powers 
of courts” and “equity jurisprudence” in CalPERS162 are particularly 
inadequate in this regard, leaving not just the content but also the variety of 
federal judicial authority unspecified. 
When federal courts exercise judicial lawmaking authority, they 
sometimes define and enforce rules that carry into effect independent federal 
 
to be applied by bankruptcy courts, which are courts of equity and ‘apply the principles and rules of 
equity jurisprudence.’” Young v. United States, 535 U.S. 43, 49-50 (2002) (citations omitted). 
155 Burbank & Wolff, Redeeming the Missed Opportunities, supra note 32, at 52. 
156 Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 18 (1941) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). 
157 Id. 
158 Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 474 (1965). See Burbank & Wolff, Redeeming the Missed 
Opportunities, supra note 32, at 52 (including “the Constitution, federal statutes, and Federal Rules” 
in “sources of unquestioned validity” as possible sources of authority for federal common law). 
159 136 S. Ct. 750 (2016). 
160 Id. at 754-55. 
161 Cf. Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 1351, 1368 (2013) (“Is the Court having 
once written dicta calling a tomato a vegetable bound to deny that it is a fruit forever after?”). 
162  Cal. Pub. Emps.’ Ret. Sys. v. ANZ Secs., Inc., 137 S. Ct. 2042, 2050-51 (2017). 
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policies and supersede contrary state law. In such cases, references to “the 
traditional power of the courts to apply the principles of equity 
jurisprudence”163 neither provide a meaningful account of the source of 
authority on which the federal courts are relying nor identify the source of 
the standard the federal court should employ. Both the Rules of Decision Act 
(“RDA”) and the Supreme Court’s federal common law jurisprudence require 
much more, a fact that Justice Frankfurter made clear in Guaranty Trust Co. 
of New York v. York when he bemoaned the fact that “equitable doctrines are 
so often cast in terms of universal applicability when close analysis of the 
source of legal enforceability is not demanded.”164 
In this Part, we provide a more fully specified account of our conclusion 
that American Pipe tolling is a federal common-law doctrine crafted by the 
Supreme Court to carry into effect the provisions of Rule 23 and the policies 
they embody: to preserve efficiency in aggregate litigation and protect the 
opt-out right that absentees enjoy in a Rule 23(b)(3) class action. In Part III, 
we undertake an explanation of the standards that should govern the 
application of that doctrine in different settings in light of the account of its 
origins that we provide here. 
A. The Different Varieties of Federal Common Law 
The term “federal common law” embraces a range of doctrines 
representing different types of federal judicial lawmaking.165 First, some of 
those doctrines relate only to the internal administration of federal court 
adjudication and have no preemptive impact in state court proceedings. 
Forum non conveniens is one example. Federal forum non conveniens doctrine 
makes a series of policy choices concerning the circumstances in which federal 
courts should decline to entertain lawsuits that have significant non-U.S. 
elements and might more appropriately be heard in non-U.S. courts.166 State 
court systems set their own policies on these questions, and when their 
standards differ from the federal standard, a dismissal from federal court on 
forum non coveniens grounds does not preclude a state court from entertaining 
 
163 Id. at 2050 (internal quotations marks omitted). 
164 326 U.S. 99, 103 (1945). The language comes from a passage in which the Court criticized practice 
under Swift v. Tyson that “gave currency” to “sentiments for uniformity of decision . . . particularly in cases 
where equitable remedies were sought, because equitable doctrines are so often cast in terms of universal 
applicability when close analysis of the source of legal enforceability is not demanded.” Id. 
165 For an extended treatment of this issue, see Tobias Barrington Wolff, Choice of Law and 
Jurisdictional Policy in the Federal Courts, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 1847, 1860-78 (2017). 
166 See Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235 (1981). 
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the suit. In such a case, an anti-suit injunction seeking to “protect or 
effectuate” the federal judgment would be invalid.167 
Second, other federal common law doctrines speak directly to questions 
of liability or regulatory policy. These doctrines are often described as 
substantive (though we eschew such labels here). They set policy on matters 
of “uniquely federal concern”168 or establish rules for the resolution of the 
competing claims of interested states. On the same day that it handed down 
Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins,169 the Court issued Hinderlider v. La Plata River 
& Cherry Creek Ditch Co.,170 a case involving competing claims by Colorado 
and New Mexico for the use of water from the La Plata River. Explaining 
that the dispute must be governed by a federal rule of decision, the Court 
confirmed a line of cases decided when Swift v. Tyson171 held sway and held 
that “neither the statutes nor the decisions of either State can be conclusive” 
because such competing claims of regulatory authority must be resolved by 
“federal common law.”172 
In the years that followed, the Court issued federal common-law rulings 
involving interstitial questions of federal law—cases where a federal statute 
left matters “to judicial determination . . . to be derived from [the statute] 
and the federal policy which it has adopted,”173 and cases where broadly-
worded statutory mandates indicated that “the policy of the law is so 
dominated by the sweep of federal statutes that legal relations which they 
affect must be deemed governed by federal law having its source in those 
statutes, rather than by local law.”174 In a number of these cases, the Court 
also took the occasion to explain that federal common law can employ 
standards derived from state law where doing so advances federal policies, 
interests, and values. In such cases, “the state law has been absorbed, as it 
were, as the governing federal rule not because state law was the source of the 
right but because recognition of state interests was not deemed inconsistent 
with federal policy.”175 Where they apply, these doctrines have preemptive 
effect: they displace contrary state law, whether in federal or state court. 
 
167 See Chick Kam Choo v. Exxon Corp., 486 U.S. 140, 146-50 (1988). The defendants in Chick Kam 
Choo also made a preemption argument that depended on the particular impact of maritime jurisdiction 
on the federal policies implicated in the case, but the Court did not resolve that question. Id. at 149-50. 
168 Clearfield Tr. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363 (1943); see also Boyle v. United Techs. Corp., 
487 U.S. 500 (1988). 
169 304 U.S. 64 (1938). 
170 304 U.S. 92 (1938). 
171 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842). 
172 Hinderlider, 304 U.S. at 110. 
173 Deitrick v. Greaney, 309 U.S. 190, 200-01 (1940). 
174 Sola Elec. v. Jefferson Elec., 317 U.S. 173, 176 (1942) (citations omitted). 
175 Bd. of Comm’rs of Jackson Cty. v. United States, 308 U.S. 343, 351-52 (1939) (citations omitted). 
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American Pipe tolling is distinct from each of these categories of federal 
common law in several important respects. As it was originally formulated, 
the doctrine carries into effect policies that relate to the administration of the 
proceedings in the initial federal action. The ruling in American Pipe 
addressed the concern that absentees would risk losing the ability to recover 
if class certification were denied and the statute of limitations were not tolled, 
giving them an incentive to file protective motions to intervene in the original 
action and thereby undermine basic purposes of a representative proceeding. 
At the same time, American Pipe tolling extends beyond the internal 
administration of the original action. The doctrine adjusts the rights of 
claimants in a fashion that touches on liability policy, authorizing plaintiffs to 
pursue claims that would otherwise be barred by the applicable limitations 
provision. And when the Court held in Crown, Cork & Seal that American Pipe 
tolling is equally available to plaintiffs who file a new lawsuit rather than 
intervening in the original action, it made clear that the doctrine applies 
outside the boundaries of the proceeding where suit was originally filed. The 
application of American Pipe tolling to subsequent actions is not simply a 
matter of comity among federal courts.176 Moreover, in so doing the Court 
preserved the value of the right to opt out in 23(b)(3) actions by eliminating 
the Hobson’s choice that claimants would face if opting out would leave them 
barred by the pertinent statute of limitations in a subsequent individual 
action. Finally, American Pipe tolling also reduces pressure on the district 
court in the original action to make a speedy and potentially improvident 
certification decision in the hope of avoiding adverse limitations 
consequences for absentees. The conclusion that precipitous certification 
decisions of this type should be discouraged prompted 2003 amendments to 
Rule 23 to relax the timing of the certification decision.177 
States are not required to permit tolling in state law class actions in their 
courts. Indeed, they need not make the class action device available at all. When 
they do authorize class actions, they are free to pursue policies that prompt 
absentees to file protective actions, or that present them with difficult choices 
in deciding whether to opt out, or that delay the certification decision, all 
 
176 See, e.g., Smith v. Bayer Corp., 564 U.S. 299, 317 (2011) (“[O]ur legal system generally relies 
on principles of stare decisis and comity among courts to mitigate the sometimes substantial costs of 
similar litigation brought by different plaintiffs . . . . [W]e would expect federal courts to apply 
principles of comity to each other’s class certification decisions when addressing a common dispute.”). 
177 See Tobias Barrington Wolff, Multiple Attempts at Class Certification, 99 IOWA L. REV. BULL. 
137, 140 (2014) (“As the Advisory Committee explained [in its notes accompanying the 2003 
amendments to Rule 23], experience had demonstrated that the practice of conditional class actions 
and the pressure to issue an order quickly had the capacity to impose improper settlement pressure 
on defendants; thus, the authority to issue conditional orders was eliminated and the requirement 
for a prompt order [contained in prior language requiring a certification decision “as soon as 
practicable after the commencement of the action”] was relaxed to ‘an early practicable time.’”). 
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subject only to the limitations (if any) imposed by the Constitution. American 
Pipe tolling carries into effect distinctively federal class action policies, and 
when the doctrine applies in state court it displaces contrary state law. 
This hybrid character—a federal common-law doctrine that aims to 
preserve and promote the provisions of and policies underlying a procedural 
rule by shaping the behavior and rights of parties in both the same and 
subsequent proceedings—makes American Pipe tolling distinctive, but hardly 
unique. This is a species of federal judicial lawmaking authority that the 
federal courts have acknowledged in other settings. In Semtek International 
Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., the Court held that “federal common law 
governs the claim-preclusive effect of a dismissal by a federal court sitting in 
diversity.”178 Having concluded that state preclusion law, borrowed as federal 
law, would usually apply, the Court indicated that a federal preclusion 
standard might be necessary to enable district courts to enforce procedural 
policies like those found in the discovery rules in cases where borrowed state 
preclusion law would not adequately do so.179 Federal preclusion doctrine is 
judge-made law that “govern[s] the effect that must be accorded federal 
judgments by other courts.”180 That being so, preclusion doctrine could not 
be “ensconced in rules governing the internal procedures of the rendering 
court itself,” which are subject to “the jurisdictional limitation of the Rules 
Enabling Act.”181 Nonetheless, the Court explained, if “state law did not 
accord claim-preclusive effect to dismissals for willful violation of discovery 
orders, federal courts’ interest in the integrity of their own processes might 
justify a contrary federal rule” that would bind subsequent tribunals.182 
American Pipe tolling operates in a similar fashion. Federal common law 
plays a necessary role in cases of this description. Procedural rules and policies 
must sometimes be enforced outside the boundaries of the initial action in 
order to be fully effective. But as the Semtek Court correctly noted, any 
interpretation of a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure that purported to “govern[] 
the effect that must be accorded federal judgments by other courts” would 
“arguably violate the jurisdictional limitation of the Rules Enabling Act.”183 In 
the absence of a governing statute, these policies would have no effective 
enforcement mechanism without federal common law to carry them into effect. 
 
178 531 U.S. 497, 508 (2001). 
179 See id. at 509; see also Burbank, Interjurisdictional Preclusion, supra note 89, at 783 
(“[U]ncertainty as to the binding nature of federal judicial action might lead to disregard of perfectly 
valid Federal Rules and orders and . . . the costs of such disregard would fall on the federal courts.”). 
180 Semtek, 531 U.S. at 503. 
181 Id. 
182 Id. at 509. These passages from Semtek speak to the applicable standard as well as the source 
of authority for the federal rule, a matter we take up in the next section. 
183 Id. at 503. 
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The same limitation would prevent any construction of a Federal Rule that 
mandated the effect that other courts must give to a ruling on class certification, 
including a tolling rule. The multiple certification issue that the Court 
addressed in Smith v. Bayer Corp.184 provides a useful illustration. In Bayer, the 
Court held that a federal judgment of dismissal in a proposed class action could 
not bind the parties in a counterpart state proceeding, both because certification 
was denied in the federal proceeding (meaning that the proposed absentees 
were not bound by the judgment) and because of differences in the certification 
standards under Rule 23 and the counterpart provision that governed in the 
subsequent state-court proceeding (meaning that issue preclusion was not 
available). In discussing possible alternatives for addressing the problem of 
multiple attempts at class certification, the Court indicated that a direct 
solution would require “legislation [enacted by Congress] to modify established 
principles of preclusion.”185 
These limitations reinforce the conclusion that we draw from a close 
reading of American Pipe and its progeny. American Pipe tolling cannot be a 
mandate flowing directly from Rule 23. The doctrine is the product of federal 
common law crafted to carry into effect policies underlying Rule 23 that do 
no violence to the REA.186 
B. Responding to the Bootstrapping Concern—Sources of Authority and Sources of 
Rules 
This account of American Pipe tolling could provoke an objection that we 
must address: bootstrapping. If the REA prohibits a Federal Rule from 
prescribing a tolling doctrine directly, the argument would go, then a judge-
made tolling doctrine grounded in federal common law cannot rely on a Federal 
Rule for the policies it carries into effect. On this view, American Pipe tolling 
would have to be prescribed by a statute enacted by Congress, or otherwise rely 
on policies arising from sources that are not constrained by the REA. Federal 
common law, the argument would go, cannot do indirectly what a Federal Rule 
 
184 564 U.S. 299 (2011). 
185 Id. at 318 n.12. In the same footnote, the Court goes on to say: “Nor does this opinion at all 
address the permissibility of a change in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure pertaining to this 
question.” Id. The Court chose more agnostic language when discussing the potential role of the 
rulemaking process here, and for good reason. Unlike federal legislation, a Federal Rule that 
purported to “modify established principles of preclusion” would violate the Enabling Act. As the 
Court explained in Semtek, “it would be peculiar to find a rule governing the effect that must be 
accorded federal judgments by other courts ensconced in rules governing the internal procedures of 
the rendering court itself. Indeed, such a rule arguably would violate the jurisdictional limitations 
of the Rules Enabling Act.” Semtek, 531 U.S. at 503. 
186 For the (misguided) suggestion that “American Pipe could be read simply to be specialized 
federal common law: a judicial gloss effectuating class actions enforcing the antitrust laws,” see 
Lowenthal & Feder, supra note 71, at 549; id. at 570, 580. 
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is prohibited from doing directly.187 So framed, this broad bootstrapping 
argument is incorrect.188 Explaining why it is incorrect provides a valuable 
occasion to understand both the sources and the limits of federal common law. 
Erie brought about a wholesale reexamination of the doctrine of federal 
common law. As we have both explored in other work, the Court undertook 
that reexamination over a period of several decades, and its efforts were often 
characterized by confusion about the interplay of the Constitution, the 
Federal Rules, the lawmaking power of federal courts, and the relationship 
between federal and state authority. One early moment of clarity came in 
Guaranty Trust, when the Court confirmed the power of federal courts to 
promulgate doctrines for the administration of the actions they adjudicate, 
even when they sit in diversity and hear cases over which they have no 
authority to declare controlling liability rules—what might be termed a weak 
form of inherent judicial power.189 
Guaranty Trust also held that this variety of federal common law was 
qualified in diversity cases by “the policy of federal jurisdiction which [Erie] 
embodies”190 to ensure that a different “form or mode” of enforcement in a 
 
187 See, e.g., Westen & Lehman, supra note 66, at 365 (“[T]he statutory prohibition on rules that 
abridge ‘substantive rights’ must be deemed to apply to judge-made rules, too; otherwise, judges could do 
through common law adjudication what they cannot do through the carefully circumscribed and 
safeguarded mechanism used to create rules of civil procedure.”); see also Wendy Collins Perdue, The Sources 
and Scope of Federal Procedural Common Law: Some Reflections on Erie and Gasperini, 46 U. KAN. L. REV. 
751, 759-61 (1998) (following Westen & Lehman); Lowenthal & Feder, supra note 71, at 556-57. Lowenthal 
and Feder recognize, however, that it is “[p]erhaps . . . too much” to require “that all procedural rules . . . 
be developed and tested as if they were Rules.” Lowenthal & Feder, supra note 71, at 557. 
188 For work that seeks to circumvent the REA’s restrictions through federal common law, and 
therefore is fairly charged with bootstrapping, more narrowly framed, see Graham C. Lilly, The 
Symmetry of Preclusion, 54 OHIO ST. L.J. 289, 319-21 (1993). The REA’s limitations cannot be evaded 
through federal common law that purports to implement a Federal Rule by advancing policies not 
properly the subject of rulemaking. See Burbank, Of Rules and Discretion, supra note 105, at 774; infra 
text accompanying note 196. 
189 The Court held that the “forms and modes of enforcing [rights in federal and state courts] 
may at times, naturally enough, vary because the two judicial systems are not identic,” Guaranty 
Trust, 326 U.S. at 108, and it explained that the power of the federal courts to adopt their own forms 
and modes of enforcement flows from their inherent authority as an independent court system. See 
id. at 104-05 (describing the power that federal courts have to prescribe the “forms and modes of 
proceeding in suits of . . . equity” by virtue of having “cognizance” of equity suits). Professor Barrett 
distinguished the power of federal courts to develop procedural common law in the absence of 
congressional authorization and the inherent authority of each federal court to regulate its own 
proceedings. See Amy Coney Barrett, Procedural Common Law, 94 VA. L. REV. 813, 879, 882 (2008). 
She also identified two possible sources of “nonexpress judicial power . . . inherent and implied 
incidental authority.” Id. at 851. For a recent discussion of a district court’s (weak) inherent powers, 
including limits on those powers, see Dietz v. Bouldin, 136 S. Ct. 1885, 1891-93 (2016) (affirming 
district court’s inherent power to rescind a jury discharge order). The articulated limits are that “an 
inherent power must be a reasonable response to a specific problem and the power cannot contradict 
any express rule or statute.” Id. at 1892. 
190 Guaranty Trust, 326 U.S. at 101. 
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federal diversity court would not “substantially affect the enforcement of the 
right as given by the State.”191 This holding in Guaranty Trust, inaccurately 
described in later cases as a test of pure outcome determination, was misapplied 
in a series of disputes potentially involving the application of Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure, with inadequate attention to the federal judicial origin of the 
doctrine at issue in Guaranty Trust or the sub-constitutional nature of the 
jurisdictional policy that qualified that doctrine.192 
The Court sought to resolve this confusion in Hanna v. Plumer193 when it 
provided a restatement of the doctrine that emphasized the distinction 
between cases in which the form or mode of proceeding in federal court is 
the product of a Federal Rule and those where federal common law provides 
the rule. In the process, Hanna helped to clarify the role of the RDA in this 
doctrinal economy. The RDA specifies that the laws of the several states 
provide rules of decision in courts of the United States “except where the 
Constitution or treaties of the United States or Acts of Congress otherwise 
require or provide.”194 When Hanna held that Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure, if valid, govern all questions in federal court that fall within their 
scope without any need to defer to the jurisdictional policies of the diversity 
statute (the so-called “twin aims of Erie”), it confirmed that the Federal Rules 
have the status of “Acts of Congress” through the grant of delegated 
lawmaking authority that Congress made to the Supreme Court in the 
REA.195 As with any federal statute, the federal courts have the power to carry 
into effect the policies of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure through judge-
made federal common law. In the language of the RDA, the Rules sometimes 
“require” that their provisions or policies be enforced through a preemptive 
federal common-law rule. 
The American Pipe tolling doctrine fits comfortably within this post-
Hanna taxonomy of federal common law and the Federal Rules. Like a 
preclusion doctrine of the type noted by the Semtek Court that would be 
 
191 Id. at 108-09. 
192 See, e.g., Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 556-57 (1949) (applying 
Guaranty Trust to a dispute requiring plaintiffs in a shareholders derivative class action to post a 
security bond and pay costs to prevailing defendants with only perfunctory attention to the role of 
Rule 23); id. at 557 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (“This New Jersey statute, like statutes governing 
security for costs, regulates only the procedure for instituting a particular cause of action and hence 
need not be applied in this diversity suit in the federal court. Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure defines that procedure for the federal courts.”); id. at 560 (Rutledge, J., dissenting) (“In 
my view Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, derived from the former Equity Rules and 
now having the sanction of Congress, is valid and governs in the Cohen case.”). 
193 380 U.S. 460 (1965). 
194 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (2012). 
195 Id. § 2072(a) (2012) (“The Supreme Court shall have the power to prescribe general rules 
of practice and procedure and rules of evidence for cases in the United States district courts 
(including proceedings before magistrate judges thereof) and courts of appeals.”). 
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necessary to enforce sanctions for discovery violations, American Pipe tolling 
is a mechanism for carrying into effect provisions contained in, and policies 
animating, a law (Rule 23) that has been promulgated pursuant to a grant of 
delegated authority. As previously observed when discussing the preclusion 
questions that the Court later addressed in Semtek: 
In authorizing the Court to promulgate Federal Rules, Congress must have 
contemplated that the federal courts would interpret them, fill their 
interstices, and, when necessary, ensure that their provisions were not 
frustrated by other legal rules. That does not mean that the federal courts are 
free to create uniform federal decisional law or displace particular state law 
rules in areas untouched by the Federal Rules. Nor does it mean that the 
federal courts can create federal common law on the basis of policies not 
validly the concern of Federal Rules. It does mean, however, that when the 
Supreme Court has exercised the power delegated by Congress to prescribe 
uniform Federal Rules, we should regard those rules, if valid, as if they were 
Acts of Congress. In effect, they are assimilated to the Enabling Act for 
purposes of the Rules of Decision Act. Because Federal Rules cannot validly 
provide for the creation of federal common law . . . they are sources of power 
only if, fairly read, they may be said to require it.196 
This account of the authority undergirding the American Pipe rule does 
not answer the question of the standard that should govern either the reach 
or the limits of the doctrine in particular contexts. “Here as elsewhere it is 
essential to distinguish sources of authority from sources of rules.”197 We take 
up the complex set of questions surrounding the applicable standard in the 
next section. But this account does answer a broadly framed bootstrapping 
argument, which would conflate these issues.198 This bootstrapping objection 
argues that when the limitations of the Enabling Act prevent Rule 23 from 
serving as the direct source of a tolling rule they must also prevent Rule 23 
from serving as the source of the policies informing the mandatory tolling 
rule carried into effect through federal common law. Hanna, properly 
understood, forecloses that argument when it confirms the status of Federal 
Rules as federal statutory authority for purposes of the RDA. “Judge-made 
 
196 Burbank, Interjurisdictional Preclusion, supra note 89, at 773-74; accord Stephen B. Burbank, 
Where’s the Beef ? The Interjurisdictional Effects of New Jersey’s Entire Controversy Doctrine, 28 RUTGERS 
L. REV. 87, 115-16 (1996) [hereinafter “Where’s the Beef ?”] (federal common law implementing 
policies underlying Rule 19); Perdue, supra note 187, at 759 (“The Rules, just like any statute, provide 
a basis for common law law-making.”). 
197 Stephen B. Burbank, Aggregation on the Couch: The Strategic Uses of Ambiguity and Hypocrisy, 
106 COLUM. L. REV. 1924, 1947 (2006) [hereinafter Aggregation]. 
198 ”The Court was not persuaded by the attempt of the petitioners in American Pipe to measure 
the Court’s power to make law ‘by judicial decision’ according to its power to make law by ‘court 
rule.’” Burbank, Hold the Corks, supra note 25, at 1028. 
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federal common law tolling a statute of limitations need not observe the Rules 
Enabling Act’s restrictions simply because the Court fashioned that law, 
which it was otherwise empowered to do, with reference to (nonlimitations) 
policies underlying Rule 23.”199 
To hold otherwise would be to yoke the source of authority to the source 
of the policies sought to be enforced and, in effect, to limit federal courts to 
the weak and qualified form of federal common law that was the subject of 
Guaranty Trust. Such limitations on federal judicial lawmaking would be 
unsustainable. As one of us wrote in a related context, “when the Supreme 
Court makes law through supervisory court rules [under the authority 
delegated by Congress in the REA], it is engaged in an enterprise that, both 
practically and normatively, is different in important respects from the 
enterprise in which the Court, or any federal court, is engaged when it makes 
federal common law.”200 The Supreme Court, acting as rulemaker, has 
adopted a set of procedural provisions and policies through the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure that are not dictated by state law. Those procedural 
provisions and policies apply equally in diversity and federal question cases, 
and federal courts must have the power to give them effect in either setting. 
As with the federal common law of preclusion that the Court discussed in 
Semtek, the jurisdictional setting may have some impact on the standard that 
should govern, but it has no impact on the source of authority for the exercise 
of federal common law. 
III. THE REACH AND LIMITS OF AMERICAN PIPE’S FEDERAL 
COMMON-LAW RULE 
As the discussion in Part II makes clear, there are different varieties of 
federal judge-made law, and each may have a different reach and different 
limits depending on its source of authority and the context in which the 
question arises. Thus, what courts and commentators often refer to as 
inherent judicial power finds its source of authority, and also its reach and 
limits, in Article III of the Constitution and in statutes conferring subject 
matter jurisdiction on the federal courts and regulating their proceedings, 
 
199 Aggregation, supra note 197, at 1947. Cf. Cooper v. Fed. Reserve Bank of Richmond, 467 U.S. 
867, 880 (1984) (“If the Bank’s theory [which would have precluded members of unsuccessful pattern 
and practice Title VII class action from thereafter bringing individual disparate treatment claims] 
were adopted, it would be tantamount to requiring that every member of the class be permitted to 
intervene to litigate the merits of his individual claim.”). 
200 Burbank, Hold the Corks, supra note 25, at 1021; see also Burbank, Interjurisdictional Preclusion, 
supra note 89, at 774 (“Even when legal regulation in a certain area is forbidden to the Rules, the 
policies underlying valid rules may help to shape valid federal common law.”). 
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including statutes that prescribe the law to be applied.201 Being nothing more 
than federal common law, it must be consistent with those statutes, unless 
one of them sought to deprive the federal courts of a power necessary to 
function as such under Article III.202 The source of authority for the federal 
common law tolling rule emerging from American Pipe and its progeny is not 
a statute but a rule of court prescribed under a delegation of legislative 
authority, Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 
In this Part, we explore the reach and limits of American Pipe’s federal 
common-law tolling rule in a number of the contexts in which the question 
can arise. Before turning to that discussion, however, it is useful to recall that, 
like the federal common law of preclusion, the common-law tolling rule 
emerging from American Pipe and its progeny was framed in anticipation of, 
or with reference to, different litigation from the litigation that initially 
triggered it.203 Yet, as to both preclusion and tolling, the lawmaking choices 
underlying the rules in question were designed in part to shape the incentives 
of litigants in service of the institutional interests of the federal courts, 
including those of the court presiding in the initial litigation. 
A. Cases Governed by Federal Statutes with Limitations Provisions 
We start with cases that, like American Pipe and Crown, Cork & Seal, 
involve claims brought in federal court under federal statutes with their own 
limitations provisions. In such cases, there can be no doubt about the 
existence of federal lawmaking power to fashion all of the governing law, and 
there similarly should be no question about the existence of federal judicial 
lawmaking power to fashion a tolling rule so long as it is (1) consistent with 
the statutory limitations provision and (2) implements either general 
equitable principles, against the background of which Congress is deemed to 
legislate, or the provisions of, or policies underlying, other federal law, which 
for that reason can serve as the source of authority. 
 
201 See, e.g., Link v. Wabash R.R. Co., 370 U.S. 626, 630-33 (1962); Ex parte Peterson, 253 U.S. 
300, 312 (1920). 
202 Responding to careless assertions of federal inherent judicial power, one of us has observed: 
“[U]nlike the judiciaries of some states, the federal courts have very little inherent judicial power in 
the strong sense—power that prevails as against a conflicting legislative prescription. In order to 
qualify as such for a federal court the power must be ‘necessary to the exercise of all others.’” 
Burbank, Role of Congress, supra note 73, at 1686. The author then observed that “[t]he federal courts 
do have substantial inherent power in the weak sense—power to make procedural law and ‘to provide 
themselves with appropriate instruments required for the performance of their duties’ in the course 
of deciding cases, in the absence of congressional authorization.” Id. (footnotes omitted). 
203 For this purpose, “different litigation” means both cases that are wholly separate and 
litigation that is different because, although that which triggered and shaped the tolling rule was a 
putative class action, that in which it is applied is not. The latter description, of course, captures 
American Pipe, while the former captures Crown, Cork & Seal. 
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As we demonstrate in Part I, the American Pipe Court did not rely on the 
tradition of equity in fashioning a tolling rule. Rather, imagining the litigant 
incentives that failure to toll the governing limitations provision would create 
when certification was denied, and the effects that the resulting behavior would 
have on the federal courts in which putative class actions were filed thereafter, 
the Court concluded that such effects would frustrate central policies 
underlying Rule 23. In Crown, Cork & Seal, similar reasoning led the Court to 
rely on Rule 23 as the source of authority for extending the common-law tolling 
rule to those who chose to bring their own lawsuits, rather than intervening, 
after the denial of class certification. Moreover, in relying on the Eisen decision 
for support of that extension, the Court made clear what a careful reading of 
American Pipe suggests, namely that those who opt out of a certified (b)(3) class 
must also have the benefit of tolling. In the context of a certified class, tolling 
is necessary to safeguard—preserve as “meaningful”—the specific provision 
conferring that right, Rule 23(c)(2), which in turn was written so as to ensure 
that due process of law is accorded absent members of a certified class. 
American Pipe obviously controls as to intervention in the federal court that 
denied certification, as does Crown, Cork & Seal as to individual actions filed in 
federal court, whether it be the court that denied certification or some other.204 
There are many reasons why a class member, after the denial of class certification, 
might prefer to bring an individual suit rather than intervene. The forum in 
which the class action is pending might be an inconvenient one, for example, or 
the class member might not wish to share control over the litigation with other 
plaintiffs once the economies of a class action were no longer available.205 
What if, however, the federal claim is within the concurrent jurisdiction 
of the state courts, and, after certification is denied, a member of the putative 
class files an individual action raising the same claim in state court? Or, on 
the same assumption, what if a member of a certified (b)(3) class opts out and 
files an individual action raising the same claim in state court?    
 
204 Throughout the discussion in this Part, we assume that the individuals seeking to intervene 
or bringing their own actions advance claims identical to those made in the putative class action. We 
thus do not take a position on the question whether American Pipe tolling should be available to 
claims under different laws that arise out of the same nucleus of operative facts as the claims initially 
brought. See, e.g., Zarecor v. Morgan Keegan & Co., 801 F.3d 882, 888 (8th Cir. 2015) (limiting 
tolling to claims that were pleaded in putative class action); Drennan v. PNC Bank Nat’l. Assoc., 
622 F.3d 275, 300 (3d Cir. 2010) (noting “strong argument” for tolling of claims that “appear to share 
a common factual and legal nexus”); Tosti v. City of L.A., 754 F.2d 1485, 1489 (9th Cir. 1985) 
(holding that individual suit need not “be identical in every respect”); Shankles v. Costa Armatori, 
S.P.A., 722 F.2d 861, 868 (3d Cir. 1983) (finding no toll for different claim arising from same fire 
that was the basis of class action). 
205 Crown, Cork & Seal Co. v. Parker, 462 U.S. 345, 350 (1983). 
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None of the three pertinent Supreme Court cases (including Eisen) 
presented these questions, a fact that should prompt caution about the import 
of unqualified statements in the Court’s opinions.206 Yet, in a state court case 
governed by federal substantive law and a federal limitations provision, on 
what basis could the state court refuse to permit American Pipe tolling? 
Although Rule 23’s direct application is confined to the federal courts, not so 
a federal common-law rule deemed necessary to protect its provisions, 
policies, and ultimately the federal court system. “Under traditional federal 
common law analysis, preclusion rules are ‘[l]egal rules which impact 
significantly upon the effectuation of federal rights.’ The existence of that 
potential for impact in state litigation involving federal substantive rights 
supports federal lawmaking competence just as it does in federal litigation.”207 
The same is true for limitations rules.208 A convincing case cannot be made 
for uniform federal judge-made preclusion rules to govern state judicial 
proceedings on federal claims as F1. The state preclusion law that governs, 
however, is displaced when hostile to or inconsistent with federal interests.209 
By contrast, it is difficult to imagine an interest that could support refusal to 
apply American Pipe tolling in state judicial proceedings on federal claims as 
F2, and it is thus difficult to avoid the conclusion that state courts are bound 
to apply this federal tolling law under the Supremacy Clause of Article VI. 
We reached the foregoing conclusion without considering the impact that 
permitting state courts to refuse to toll in these circumstances could have on 
the federal interests sought to be protected by American Pipe and its progeny. 
 
206 See, e.g., Am. Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538,  550 (1974) (“[T]he filing of a timely 
class action complaint commences the action for all members of the class as subsequently 
determined.”); id. at 554 (“[T]he rule most consistent with federal class action procedure must be 
that the commencement of a class action suspends the applicable statute of limitations as to all 
asserted members of the class who would have been parties had the suit been permitted to continue 
as a class action.”). 
207 Burbank, Interjurisdictional Preclusion, supra note 89, at 810 (citation omitted). Professor 
Barrett included preclusion rules as one of five categories of “procedural common law” she examined, 
claiming that “none of these doctrines, as a rule, applies in state courts.” Barrett, supra note 189, at 
823 n.22. Elsewhere, however, she noted that the proposition did not extend to “the context of 
interjurisdictional preclusion,” id. at 831, an exception that, when preclusion is involved, swallows 
the rule. The problem appears to be one of definition, demonstrating once again the hazards of 
procedure/substance dichotomies. 
208 For a case holding that American Pipe governs the tolling effect of a putative state court class 
action brought to enforce a federal statute, and subject to a federal limitations period, see Sawyer v. 
Atlas Heating & Sheet Metal Works, Inc., 642 F.3d 560, 562 (7th Cir. 2011). This is a different question 
from that discussed in the text, and the Sawyer court’s analysis is inadequate to the task. See id. (“Federal 
law determines the tolling effect of a suit governed by a federal statute of limitations. American Pipe 
establishes that federal rule.”); see also Respondents’ Brief, supra note 29, at 33 (“As long as American 
Pipe is a product of the equitable powers of federal courts[,] . . . it makes little difference whether the 
putative class action said to toll an otherwise untimely individual federal court action proceeded in state 
court or federal court. Either way, it is federal law that is doing the tolling.”). 
209 See Burbank, Interjurisdictional Preclusion, supra note 89, at 810-17. 
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It was enough that such refusal could cause the plaintiffs in question to lose 
their rights under federal substantive law. Thereafter, the incentive structure 
that would be created by permitting state courts as F2 to refuse tolling to 
members of a putative class who, either upon denial of certification or after 
opting out of a certified class, brought individual suits in those courts would 
be akin to that described in Crown, Cork & Seal: “A putative class member 
who fears that class certification may be denied would have every incentive 
to file a separate action prior to the expiration of his own period of 
limitations. The result would be a needless multiplicity of actions . . . .”210 
There is a difference, however. Those seeking to take advantage of American 
Pipe tolling could avoid the dilemma by bringing their individual actions in 
federal court.211 Even assuming that the law of personal jurisdiction and venue 
would always make such a court available, requiring individuals to surrender 
the choice of forum conferred by federal jurisdictional statutes is a questionable 
way to respond to state interests that are hard to discern and may, in fact, reduce 
to an interest in not incurring some of the costs of the disintegration (or, in the 
case of opt-outs, diminishment) of a class action in another jurisdiction.212 Such 
an interest, if not simply inconsistent with federal statutes granting concurrent 
subject matter jurisdiction,213 hardly seems sufficient to displace federal 
common law that is otherwise pertinent and valid. 
In Dow Chemical v. Blanco,214 the Delaware Supreme Court considered the 
practical reasons to give effect to another state’s class action tolling rule. 
Observing that, although “American Pipe and its progeny all involved class 
actions and subsequent suits brought in the same jurisdiction,” the court 
concluded that “this factual distinction makes no legal difference.” It reasoned 
that the Supreme Court’s analysis—balancing the competing interests of class 
actions (efficiency and economy of litigation) and statutes of limitation 
(notice to the defendants)—“is equally sound regardless of whether the 
 
210 Crown, Cork & Seal, 462 U.S. at 350-51. 
211 We assume that defendants sued in state court would not remove to federal court if the 
state court could validly refuse to apply American Pipe tolling. 
212 See, e.g., Wade v. Danek Med., Inc., 182 F.3d 281, 287 (4th Cir. 1999) (predicting that 
Virginia Supreme Court would not apply a cross-jurisdictional tolling rule for three reasons, one of 
which was that “Virginia would be faced with a flood of subsequent filings once a class action in 
another forum is dismissed, as forum-shopping plaintiffs from across the country rush into the 
Virginia courts to take advantage of its cross-jurisdictional tolling rule.”). The prediction turned out 
to be correct. See Casey v. Merck & Co. (Casey III), 722 S.E.2d 842 (Va. 2012) (responding to 
questions certified to it in Casey v. Merck & Co. (Casey II), 653 F.3d 95 (2d Cir. 2011)); see also 
Casey v. Merck & Co. (Casey IV), 678 F.3d 134 (2d Cir. 2012) (ordering dismissal as untimely). 
213 See Mims v. Arrow Fin. Servs., 565 U.S. 368, 378 (2012) (emphasizing the “deeply rooted 
presumption in favor of concurrent state court jurisdiction”) (citation omitted). 
214 67 A.3d 392 (Del. 2013). 
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original class action is brought in the same or in a different jurisdiction as the 
later individual action.”215 
The Delaware court had a choice whether to apply class action tolling 
interjurisdictionally, because there is no federal constitutional or other legal 
barrier to states applying their own tolling law as F2 to the claims of litigants in 
their courts who were putative class members in another state’s courts as F1. But 
its reasoning suggests the costs of applying F2’s tolling law, costs that are the same 
when the first action was heard in federal court. The case thus confirms that, at 
least in this context, the federal common-law rule stated in American Pipe and its 
progeny must apply interjurisdictionally if it is to be effective in protecting 
federal courts against bearing all of the institutional costs of (1) interventions and 
protective actions when a class is not certified, and (2) ensuring that the opt-out 
rights of the members of certified classes remain “meaningful.” 
B. Diversity Cases 
The question remains whether the tolling rule emerging from American 
Pipe and its progeny is a pertinent and valid rule of federal common law in 
other class actions brought in federal court as F1. All of the Court’s class 
action tolling cases have involved federal substantive law claims, and most of 
them have involved federal limitations provisions. The question is most 
difficult to answer when the claims arise under state law, the limitations 
period is provided by state law, and the federal court’s subject matter 
jurisdiction rests on diversity of citizenship. Most lower federal courts have 
declined to use federal tolling law in that setting, but their decisions have 
analyzed the question from the perspective of a federal diversity court sitting 
as F2 and, in a number of the cases, as a problem of “cross-jurisdictional 
tolling.”216 A similar lack of focus renders less persuasive one of the few 
decisions viewing “the federal interest here as sufficiently strong to justify 
tolling in a diversity case when the state law provides no relief.”217 Here, as 
elsewhere in the landscape we survey, there has been insufficient attention to 
the sources of authority for federal law. 
In Section B.1, we explore the implications of our approach for state law 
cases in federal court by reason of diversity jurisdiction. We then turn, in 
 
215 Id. at 397. 
216 See, e.g., Thomas v. U.S. Bank Nat. Assoc., 789 F.3d 900, 903 (8th Cir. 2015); State Farm 
Mut. Auto Ins. Co. v. Boellstroff, 540 F.3d 1223, 1228 (10th Cir. 2008); Wade v. Danek Med., Inc., 
182 F.3d 281, 289 (4th Cir. 1999); Vaught v. Showa Denka K.K., 107 F.3d 1137, 1146-47 (5th Cir. 1997). 
The courts in Wade and Vaught focused on the problem of “cross-jurisdictional tolling.” 
217 Adams Pub. Sch. Dist. v. Asbestos Corp., 7 F.3d 717, 719 (10th Cir. 1993) (dictum); see also 
Great Plains Tr. Co. v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 492 F.3d 986, 997 (10th Cir. 2007) (stating that because 
federal and state tolling law were the same, “it is not necessary for us to balance the interests of 
federal procedural law and state substantive law”). 
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Section B.2, to consider whether the regime we advocate is consistent with 
the Court’s current approach, and, if not, what changes in that approach are 
necessary. In Section B.3, we explore the consequences of our approach for 
the law applied in courts sitting as F2. Finally, in Section B.4, we circle back 
to consider whether, even though American Pipe tolling is federal common 
law, it need not be uniform and should, rather, distinguish between tolling 
and tolling effect, borrowing state law as to the latter except where doing so 
would contravene important federal interests. 
1. The Implications of Our Approach 
There is federal lawmaking power to fashion limitations law even for state 
law diversity cases. Because statutes of limitations generally involve a mix of 
policies, some of which concern the administration of the business of the 
courts, Congress could constitutionally prescribe such law for federal courts, 
including tolling rules enforceable in state court, using its power under the 
Necessary and Proper Clause to carry into effect the work of the lower federal 
courts it is empowered to create or the judicial power conferred by Article 
III.218 The Court held as much in Jinks v. Richland County when it affirmed 
the power of Congress to enact a tolling provision requiring state courts to 
extend the limitations period on a state-law claim that was previously pending 
in federal court. Upholding the mandatory tolling provision contained in the 
supplemental jurisdiction statute, the Court wrote that section 1367(d) is 
necessary and proper for carrying into execution Congress’s power “[t]o 
constitute Tribunals inferior to the supreme Court,” U.S. CONST., Art. I, § 8, 
cl. 9, and to assure that those tribunals may fairly and efficiently exercise 
“[t]he judicial Power of the United States,” Art. III, § 1.”219 As had long been 
clear, the result in Guaranty Trust was not required by Erie’s constitutional 
holding. Rather, that decision sought to implement the “policy of federal 
 
218 See Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 472 (1965) (“For the constitutional provision for a 
federal court system (augmented by the Necessary and Proper Clause) carries with it congressional 
power to make rules governing the practice and pleading in those courts, which in turn includes a 
power to regulate matters which, though falling within the uncertain area between substance and 
procedure, are rationally capable of classification as either.”). 
219 Jinks v. Richland Cty., 538 U.S. 456, 462 (2003). The Court recently relied on Jinks in rejecting 
the argument that its interpretation of section 1367(d), pursuant to which a state limitations period is 
suspended during the pendency of the federal action and for thirty days thereafter, “presents a serious 
constitutional problem.” Artis v. District of Columbia, 138 S. Ct. 594, 606 (2018). For another federal 
statutory provision that provides for the tolling of state (and federal) limitations periods while an action 
is pending in federal court, see 28 U.S.C. §1332(d)(11)(D) (2012) (Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 
provision concerning claims in “mass actions” removed to federal court). 
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jurisdiction”220 that animated much of the Erie Court’s nonconstitutional 
discussion of the “defects, political and social”221 of Swift v. Tyson.222 
If Congress provides statutory rules for the conduct of federal litigation, 
including diversity litigation, it has the power to make them binding on state 
courts when the failure to do so might frustrate their successful operation in 
federal court. Thus, concern that the failure of state courts to follow the same 
rules for waiver of privilege (and work-product protection) for disclosed 
communications would subvert their operation in the federal settings for 
which they were proposed—because risk-averse litigants would shape their 
conduct in accordance with variant state laws—led Congress to make those 
rules applicable “in a federal or state proceeding.”223 The rules in question 
were drafted by those responsible for proposing amendments to the Federal 
Rules of Evidence under the REA. They were enacted by Congress, rather 
than promulgated by the Supreme Court, because of the decision made in 
1975 to require that “[a]ny such rule creating, abolishing, or modifying an 
evidentiary privilege shall have no force or effect unless approved by Act of 
Congress.”224 In our view, if the federal standards could have been prescribed 
by valid Federal Rules, it would have been proper for federal common law to 
ensure their efficacy just as statutory Rule 502 does.225 
Concerns about the potential impact on federal court proceedings of 
litigant behavior influenced by state law are one reason Congress provided 
that the period of limitations for a non-federal claim sought to be asserted 
within the supplemental jurisdiction of the federal courts is tolled “while the 
claim is pending and for a period of 30 days after it is dismissed unless State 
law provides for a longer tolling period”226—the provision upheld in Jinks. In 
the absence of a toll, risk-averse litigants concerned about losing their state 
law claim if it were dismissed might bring it separately, or even forgo federal 
 
220 ”Our starting point must be the policy of federal jurisdiction which [Erie] embodies.” 
Guaranty Tr. Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 101 (1945) (citation omitted). 
221 Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 74 (1938); see also Edward A. Purcell, Jr., The Story of 
Erie: How Litigants, Lawyers, Judges, Politics, and Social Change Reshape the Law, in CIVIL PROCEDURE 
STORIES 21, 54-59 (Kevin M. Clermont ed., 2d ed. 2008); id. at 59-63. 
222 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842). 
223 FED. R. EVID. 502(a), (b); see also id. 502(f) (“And notwithstanding Rule 501, this rule applies 
even if state law provides the rule of decision.”). Congress also provided (in 502(b)) rules to govern the 
effect in federal proceedings of disclosures in state proceedings in certain circumstances. 
224 28 U.S.C. § 2074(b) (2012). 
225 See Stephen B. Burbank, Case One: Choice of Forum Clauses, 29 NEW ENG. L. REV. 517, 539 
(1995) (“Although . . . no existing federal statute or Federal Rule is pertinent on the . . . issue—in 
the sense that, as interpreted, it provides the legal standards for resolution of the issue—federal law 
speaks in more than one voice, and sometimes it may simply call for other federal lawmakers to 
fashion the rules.”). For a recent discussion of federal common law displacing state law in diversity 
cases, see Alexander A. Reinert, Erie Step Zero, 85 FORDHAM L. REV. 2341, 2355, 2381-83 (2017). 
226 28 U.S.C. § 1367(d) (2012). 
2018] Statutes of Limitations in Class Actions  45 
court altogether. In the former situation, the federal courts would lose the 
potential contribution to accuracy from conjoined litigation of related claims, 
while the legal system as a whole would lose the potential benefits of having 
one lawsuit instead of two. In the latter situation, litigants would lose a federal 
forum for the adjudication of claims that are within federal subject matter 
jurisdiction.227 Both concerns are within Congress’s power to address through 
the imposition of a mandatory tolling rule enforceable in state court. 
Congress did not prescribe the tolling rule in American Pipe and its 
progeny, and Rule 23 makes no policy choices about limitations, including 
tolling, even if it could validly do so under the REA. On the other hand, Rule 
23 does make explicit policy choices concerning notice and the right to opt 
out of a (b)(3) class action that require tolling for their vindication through 
federal common law, and the rule as a whole is animated by policies of 
litigation efficiency and avoidance of duplicative filings that call out for 
similar vindication in the interest of the federal court system. Those Rule 23 
provisions and policies require protection in diversity class action litigation 
as in other federal class actions. 
2. Refining the Court’s Approach 
The question, of course, is whether it is possible to reach that result under 
the Court’s existing jurisprudence. If not, the inquiry may illuminate 
deficiencies in that jurisprudence and means to address them.228 Differences 
between rules permitting and forbidding class action tolling in federal and 
state courts in the same state would materially affect the character or result 
of the litigation, and those differences would predictably lead to forum 
shopping.229 This fact suggests an argument that Erie and its progeny require 
 
227 See Jinks v. Richland Cty., 538 U.S. 456, 463-64 (2003) (using similar reasoning as one basis 
for upholding section 1367(d) against constitutional attack). The statute reflects awareness that, upon 
dismissal of their nonfederal claims, some litigants may wish to bring all of their claims in state 
court, by extending the toll to “any other claim in the same action that is voluntarily dismissed at 
the same time as or after the dismissal of the claim under subsection (a).” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(d); see 
also Artis v. District of Columbia, 138 S. Ct. 594, 607 (2018) (“How it genuinely advances federalism 
concerns to drive plaintiffs to resort to wasteful, inefficient duplication to preserve their state-law 
claims is far from apparent.”). 
228 For an extended discussion that recognizes the source of the American Pipe rule as federal 
common law but advocates a conclusion different from that reached here in diversity cases, see Lowenthal 
& Feder, supra note 71, at 556-68. Systematic refutation of their analysis would unduly lengthen this 
Article. Suffice it that the authors, laboring under a weak form of the bootstrap fallacy, see supra note 188, 
fail to understand that Rule 23 is the source of authority for the rule, see supra note 195, and fail to 
appreciate the varieties of federal common law. They thus miss the implications of Rule 23’s role for 
analysis under both the RDA (including in particular its “except” clause) and the Supreme Court’s federal 
common law jurisprudence. Perhaps as a result, they tend to treat “tolling rules” as a monolith. 
229 See, e.g., Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740, 752-53 (1980); Hanna v. Plumer, 380 
U.S. 460, 468-69 (1965). 
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the use of state tolling rules in a federal diversity class action. But if the RDA 
is thought to govern the issue, the displacement of state law not recognizing 
class action tolling by federal common law may reasonably be deemed 
“require[d]” by Rule 23, which for these purposes has the force of a statute.230 
Again, much of the institutional cost of a no-tolling regime, once established, 
would be borne by the federal courts,231 while states reap some of the benefits 
of federal class actions packaging claims that otherwise would have to be 
pursued individually. More broadly, protecting the efficacy of a right widely 
regarded as essential to the constitutional validity of (b)(3) actions should 
qualify as a powerful basis for a transsubstantive (and transjurisdictional) 
federal common law tolling rule. And American Pipe leaves adequate room to 
accommodate state interests in protecting defendants against unfair surprise. 
“The key,” as we have argued, 
is a nuanced appreciation of Federal Rules—one that, in the absence of 
express policy choices, resolves questions of scope by paying attention to 
what federal common law might achieve if the court could consider, in 
addition to outcome and the twin aims of Erie, federal policies demonstrably 
rooted in sources of unquestionable validity, including the Constitution, 
federal statutes, and Federal Rules.232 
Under the Court’s approach, whether or not it implements the RDA,233 
the existence of such focused and robust federal interests is a far cry from the 
“typical, relatively unguided Erie choice”234 to which the Hanna Court 
referred. As the Court has described its decision in American Pipe, “there was 
a substantial body of relevant federal procedural law to guide the decision to 
 
230 28 U.S.C. §1652 (2012) (“The laws of the several states, except where the Constitution or treaties 
of the United States or Acts of Congress otherwise require or provide, shall be regarded as rules of decision 
in civil actions in the courts of the United States, in cases where they apply.”) (emphasis added). 
231 Cf. Semtek Int’l Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 U.S. 497, 508-09 (2001) (discussing the type 
of federal interest that may support uniform judge-made rules of preclusion, as opposed to borrowed state 
law, in diversity cases); Burbank, Interjurisdictional Preclusion, supra note 89, at 764-65, 780-83 (same). 
232 Burbank & Wolff, Redeeming the Missed Opportunities, supra note 32, at 52. 
233 See Burbank, Interjurisdictional Preclusion, supra note 89, at 788 (“The policy against different 
outcomes on the basis of citizenship is a ‘policy of federal jurisdiction;’ it evidently derives from the 
act of Congress conferring diversity jurisdiction on the federal courts. In considering whether the 
Constitution or Acts of Congress (including the Rules Enabling Act) require the application of 
federal law, the federal courts must consider both policies grounded in those sources pointing 
towards a federal rule and policies pointing to the application of state law.”) (footnotes omitted). 
234 Hanna, 380 U.S. at 471. But see Couture, supra note 89, at 541; Lowenthal & Feder, supra 
note 71, at 557; Adam N. Steinman, Our Class Action Federalism, Erie, and the Rules Enabling Act after 
Shady Grove, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1131, 1160 (2011) (arguing that, because Rule 23 “does not 
address the extent to which a class action tolls the limitations period for unnamed class members 
. . . . a federal court would face a relatively unguided Erie choice”). 
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toll the limitation period, and significant underlying federal policy that would 
have conflicted with a decision not to suspend the running of the statute.”235 
The Byrd Court’s attempt to clarify Erie jurisprudence—and to save the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure from a brooding omnipresence with 
extraconstitutional force236—lacked the central insight of Hanna that solutions 
to problems in the allocation of lawmaking power between the federal 
government and the states depend on the source of putative federal law. As a 
result, in a footnote citing Sibbach,237 the Court in Byrd seemed to suggest that 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were merely one of the “affirmative 
countervailing considerations”238 that, as against the policy of federal 
jurisdiction, may tip the scales in favor of the application of federal judge-made 
law in a diversity case. From this perspective, it is no surprise that, once armed 
with that central insight and its implications for the validity of Federal Rules, 
the Court has hardly mentioned Byrd since the Hanna decision in 1965.239  
Once one recognizes that Federal Rules, like federal statutes, can be 
legitimate sources of authority for federal common law, a dilemma that has 
vexed the Court since Hanna becomes more tractable. Under the Court’s 
decisions it has seemed almost impossible for federal judge-made law to 
survive Hanna’s modified outcome-determination test in a diversity case, and 
equally unlikely for a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure to fail Hanna’s tests for 
validity under the Constitution and the REA. The Court’s awareness of this 
dilemma has led it to lurch from one extreme to the other in the 
interpretation of the Federal Rules, yielding what we have called an 
“incoherent jurisprudence of scope.”240 In some of the cases in which the 
Court gave an unpersuasively broad interpretation to a Federal Rule (or to a 
federal statute), more satisfactory rationales were at hand: federal common 
law or preemption, which we regard as a subset of federal common law. 
 
235 Johnson v. Ry. Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454, 466 (1975). See supra text accompanying 
note 86. Cf. O’Melveny & Myers v. FDIC, 512 U.S. 79, 89 (1994) (“[T]his argument demonstrates 
the runaway tendencies of ‘federal common law’ untethered to a genuinely identifiable (as opposed 
to judicially constructed) federal policy.”). 
236 See John Hart Ely, The Irrepressible Myth of Erie, 87 HARV. L. REV. 693, 709 (1974). 
237 See Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Coop., Inc., 356 U.S. 525, 538 n.12 (1958). The footnote 
occurs after the words “compliance with a state rule” in the following sentence: “The policy of 
uniform enforcement of state-created rights and obligations, . . . cannot in every case exact 
compliance with a state rule—not bound up with rights and obligations—which disrupts the federal 
system of allocating functions between judge and jury.” Id. at 537-38 (citations omitted). 
238 Id. at 537. 
239 See Burbank, Aggregation, supra note 197, at 1948-49. “Indeed, in virtually the Court’s only 
subsequent decision that can plausibly be deemed to have applied Byrd, it ignored that case in dealing 
with the problem on which it might have made a difference and invoked it on the problem for which it 
was redundant.” Id. at 1949 (describing Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415 (1996)). 
240 See Burbank & Wolff, Redeeming the Missed Opportunities, supra note 32, at 35-41. 
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Even if the Byrd Court’s footnote citing Sibbach was misdirected, and even 
though a Federal Rule does not directly furnish governing law, its provisions 
and animating policies may furnish “affirmative countervailing 
considerations” to the application of state law in federal diversity actions. In 
such a case, although the application of federal judge-made law different from 
state law might promote forum shopping, the result would not be “inequitable 
administration of the laws.”241 When federal common law is reasonably 
deemed necessary to protect the provisions of a Federal Rule or the policies 
animating that rule, there are good reasons for a federal court sitting in 
diversity not to apply contrary state law. An explanation of those reasons 
should persuade a sophisticated client that the difference is not the product 
of invidious discrimination.242 American Pipe tolling thus presents a situation 
unlike that in Walker v. Armco Steel Corp.243 where, having held that Rule 3 
did not govern according to its plain meaning, the Court evidently found 
underlying that Rule no federal policies that were pertinent to the 
administration of state statutes of limitations.244 
In providing for class actions as a means to facilitate the efficient and 
expeditious resolution of related money damages actions in Rule 23(b)(3), the 
rulemakers sought (among other goals) to confer benefits on both the federal 
and state court systems, as well as litigants. A right to opt out was central to 
the adoption of (b)(3), and that right and notice which permits its exercise 
may even be constitutionally required.245 The application of state law that did 
 
241 “The ‘outcome-determination’ test therefore cannot be read without reference to the twin 
aims of the Erie rule: discouragement of forum-shopping and avoidance of inequitable 
administration of the laws.” Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 560, 468 (1965). 
242 See Stephen B. Burbank, The Bitter With the Sweet: Tradition, History, and Limitations on 
Federal Judicial Power—A Case Study, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1291, 1320 n.165 (2000) [hereinafter 
Bitter with the Sweet] (“This is one way of giving independent content to the notion of ‘inequitable 
administration of the laws’ as used in Hanna’s dictum.”); Richard W. Bourne, Federal Common Law 
and the Erie-Byrd Rule, 12 U. BALT. L. REV. 426, 474-75 (1983) (“If the justification for the burden is 
great enough, none would call the impact ‘unfair.’ Moreover, on the face of it, federal procedural 
policies seem capable, at least in certain circumstances, of providing such justification.”). 
243 446 U.S. 740 (1980). 
244 See id. at 753 (“There is simply no reason why, in the absence of a controlling federal rule [an 
action that would be barred in state court by a state statute of limitations should proceed to judgment 
in a federal diversity court].”). In West v. Conrail, 481 U.S. 35 (1987), the Court gave Rule 3 a second 
“plain meaning,” holding that it provided the governing rule for stopping a federal limitations period 
that was borrowed to fill a gap in federal law. The decision is probably best, and most charitably, 
explained by the Court’s long-enduring failure to recognize that the REA’s limitations were animated 
by separation of powers, not federalism, concerns. It may also have reflected the view that there was no 
harm in imputing to Rule 3 what federal common law could have accomplished. For a discussion of 
West, see Burbank, Of Rules and Discretion, supra note 105, at 698-710. 
245 For discussion of the fallacy that has led the Court to treat a limited holding about the personal 
jurisdiction of state courts in class action proceedings as a general statement about the due process right 
of absent class members to an individual opt-out opportunity, see Tobias Barrington Wolff, Federal 
Jurisdiction and Due Process in the Era of the Nationwide Class Action, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 2035, 2076-79 
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not recognize class action tolling in a state law diversity case would 
undermine federal policies that are basic to Rule 23, a right that it affords, 
and the constitutional interests that are protected by that right. Those federal 
policies and interests are of sufficient weight to subordinate the federal 
jurisdictional policy against different outcomes on the basis of citizenship.246 
The Court appears to have recognized the need for this species of federal 
authority in Tullock v. Mulvane.247 Tullock involved an action brought in state 
court seeking damages on an injunction bond that had been required in an 
earlier federal proceeding. At issue was the ability to recover attorney’s fees 
as part of the damages claimed on the bond. Federal law disallowed that type 
of damages, but the local law of the state court would permit it. Reversing a 
decision of the Kansas Supreme Court, the Court held that federal law 
developed under the authority of a federal equity rule must control the 
measure of damages for such a claim, even when brought in state court: 
To hold the contrary, as we have previously pointed out, would be but to declare 
that although the power conferred by Congress upon this court to adopt equity 
rules is controlling, nevertheless the interpretations of the rules and the limitations 
which arise from a proper construction of them . . . are without avail.248 
Against this view of Tullock is the fact that, at that time, the authority for 
federal courts sitting in equity to require security when granting an injunction 
was Equity Rule 90, which provided: 
In all cases where the rules prescribed by this court or by the circuit court do 
not apply, the practice of the circuit court shall be regulated by the present 
practice of the High Court of Chancery in England, so far as the same may 
be reasonably applied consistently with the local circumstances and local 
 
(2008) (describing the “persistent confusion surrounding the meaning of the Court’s opinion in” 
Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797 (1985)). Whatever its analytical demerits, this position 
appears to have become a part of the Court’s understanding of the constitutional framework 
surrounding the class action and so must be taken into account when discussing the constellation of 
policies that American Pipe tolling seeks to effectuate. See, e.g., Wal-Mart Stores v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 
363 (2010) (“In the context of a class action predominantly for money damages we have held that the 
absence of notice and opt-out violates due process.”) (citing Shutts, 472 U.S. at 812). 
246 See Burbank, Aggregation, supra note 197, at 1949 (“[T[he balancing process Byrd seemed to 
authorize . . . balanced one federal policy against another, not ‘federal and state interests.’”); Bourne, 
supra note 242, at 491-92 (“[F]ederal courts considering the impact of rejected class certifications 
brought under diversity jurisdiction would have power to disregard state cases declining to toll their 
statutes of limitations in comparable circumstances.”). But see Vaught v. Showa Denko K.K., 107 F.3d 
1137, 1147 (5th Cir. 1997) (“[T]he federal interest in that practice does not trump the Texas tolling 
rule.”). The Vaught court focused on the state in which the F2 diversity court was located, and it 
misapprehended what is to be balanced under Byrd. 
247 184 U.S. 497 (1902). 
248 Id. at 513. 
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conveniences of the district where the court is held, not as positive rules, but 
as furnishing just analogies to regulate the practice.249 
Yet, as Professor Collins observes, “[t]he equity principles applied in 
federal court were not . . . considered supreme federal law that state courts 
were required to apply, and in that regard they were unlike today’s federal 
common law.”250 They were also unlike the rule announced in Tullock. 
Today, the Federal Rules specifically require that one moving for a 
preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order give security “in an 
amount that the court considers proper to pay the costs and damages sustained 
by any party found to have been wrongfully enjoined or restrained.”251 Rather 
than justifying the displacement of state law that would permit recovery of 
attorney’s fees on the ground that the long-standing federal rule to the contrary 
is an interpretation of “costs and damages” in Rule 65(c),252 we prefer—and the 
REA counsels—an account founded in the need for a uniform judge-made rule, 
if, indeed, the case for it can be made. Such a rule would be a far cry from 
viewing Rule 65 “as a broad charter for federal common law,” which neither the 
Rule’s language nor its history supports.253 It would thus be like the rule in 
Tullock viewed in the larger context described by Professor Collins. 
3. Consequences for F2 
If, as we contend, the federal common law tolling rule of American Pipe 
and its progeny governs in a state law diversity action, displacing a no-tolling 
rule of the state in which the federal court sits, lack of fair notice to the 
defendant within the limitations period remains the only basis for refusing to 
toll a state statute of limitations on behalf of a member of a putative class in 
a diversity action, because judicial power to accommodate that interest is part 
of the federal common-law rule that governs in F1. Inconsistency of tolling 
with a federal statute of limitations or repose remains a threshold barrier to 
validity in federal question cases, but inconsistency with state limitations law 
is not a barrier in state law diversity cases. Federal common law overrides 
contrary state law in this setting. 
 
249 Id. at 510; accord Russell v. Farley, 105 U.S. 433, 437 (1882); Kristin A. Collins, “A 
Considerable Surgical Operation”: Article III, Equity, and Judge-Made Law in the Federal Courts, 60 DUKE 
L.J. 249, 274 (2010) (“In the absence of an applicable federal equity rule, for example, a federal court 
sitting in Georgia was to look to English chancery practice to determine what procedures to follow, 
rather than to the practices of Georgia state courts.”). 
250 Collins, supra note 249, at 290. 
251 FED. R. CIV. P. 65(c). 
252 See Minn. Power & Light Co. v. Hockett, 14 Fed. Appx. 703, 707 (7th Cir. 2001). 
253 Burbank, Bitter with the Sweet, supra note 242 at 1335. 
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On this view, the analysis in Part III.A applies with equal force to 
questions that may arise concerning litigation brought in state courts or 
federal courts in other states.254 Just as when F1 involves a federal claim and 
a federal limitations provision, federal common law would be “a craven 
watchdog”255 of Rule 23 policies and of the right to opt out if state courts were 
free to apply a no-tolling (or no cross-jurisdictional tolling) rule in 
independent suits brought by members of the class in the diversity action.256 
Again, although states remain free to deny “cross-jurisdictional tolling” to 
litigants who were the members of class actions brought in the courts of other 
states, they have no such power with respect to a pertinent and valid federal 
common-law rule emerging from a federal court as F1. In this context as well, 
more than comity is involved.257 The Supremacy Clause requires 
interjurisdictional tolling. As a result, no state need fear an avalanche of 
individual actions by reason of its choice on the issue (if it were governed by 
state law), and one of the major policy reasons for denying such tolling 
disappears (as to federal class actions).258 
 
254 See supra text accompanying notes 205–215. 
255 See Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank, Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 266 (2010) (“But the presumption 
against extraterritorial application would be a craven watchdog indeed if it retreated to its kennel 
whenever some domestic activity is involved in the case.”). 
256 As always, the F2 court is free to protect against subversion of the governing limitations 
law’s policies by ensuring adequate notice of the claims. 
257 Not recognizing this, the Tennessee Supreme Court observed: 
Our adoption of cross-jurisdictional tolling could, in a general sense, benefit the 
federal court system in its disposition of class actions. Nevertheless, Tennessee simply 
has no interest, except perhaps out of comity, in furthering the efficiency and economy 
of the class action procedures of another jurisdiction, whether those of the federal 
courts or those of another state. 
Maestas v. Sofamor Dane Group, Inc., 33 S.W.3d 805, 808 (Tenn. 2000) (internal quotations 
omitted); see also Wade v. Danek Med. Inc., 182 F.3d 281, 287 (4th Cir. 1999). 
258 See, e.g., Portwood v. Ford Motor Co., 701 N.E.2d 1102, 1104 (Ill. 1998) (expressing concern 
that tolling “may actually increase the burden on that state court’s system, because plaintiffs from 
across the country may elect to file a subsequent suit in that state solely to take advantage of the 
generous tolling rule”); Wade, 182 F.3d at 287; see also David Bober, Comment, Cross-Jurisdictional 
Tolling: When and Whether a State Court Should Toll its Statute of Limitations Based on the Filing of a 
Class Action in Another Jurisdiction, 32 SETON HALL L. REV. 617, 652 n.228 (2002) (“Writing on a 
clean slate, one could strike the balance differently than have the majority of courts. If all (or at least 
most) states embraced cross-jurisdictional tolling (and class action tolling in fact reduced the number 
of “protective” suits), then cross-jurisdictional tolling would be cost-beneficial even where the class 
action was not pending in the state’s own courts. But that train seems to have already left the 
station.”) (quoting Mitchell A. Lowenthal, Tolling the Statute of Limitations on Class Actions, N.Y. L.J., 
Dec. 17, 2001, at 1). 
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B.4. Borrowed State Law? 
Finally, the Supreme Court’s decision in Chardon v. Fumero Soto259 suggests 
the possibility that a distinction should be drawn between the existence of a 
tolling rule and the effect prescribed by any such rule.260 Chardon was governed 
by section 1988, but the distinction might be equally pertinent in a state-law 
diversity action.261 The distinction is also suggested by Semtek. The Court 
recognized there that federal common law is necessary to ensure that the 
constitutional and statutory grants of subject matter jurisdiction, including 
diversity jurisdiction, are not set at naught by state courts disregarding federal 
judgments. At the same time, the Court recognized that the state law of F1 
could be borrowed for most questions of preclusion without the sacrifice of 
that or other federal interests.262 Thus, we must confront a difficult question: 
if the state in which a federal diversity court sits recognizes class action tolling 
but provides for a different tolling effect than that prescribed in American Pipe 
and its progeny (suspension of the limitations period until the class 
certification decision is made or, in the case of a certified class, until a member 
opts out), which law supplies the standard? 
Chardon is a troublesome decision.263 Justice Rehnquist makes a forceful 
argument in his dissent that American Pipe announced a uniform suspension 
rule in this aspect (albeit one of federal common law),264 and he argues that 
the Court’s opinion to the contrary seems to sow uncertainty and invite 
wasteful litigation in an area where certainty and predictability are especially 
 
259 462 U.S. 650 (1983). We discuss Chardon in Part I, supra text accompanying notes 103–135. 
260 A number of lower courts have apparently missed this and other distinctions, leading them 
into error. See, e.g., Sawyer v. Atlas Heating & Sheet Metal Works, Inc., 642 F.3d 560, 562-563 (7th 
Cir. 2011) (describing Chardon as “holding that, when the statute of limitations depends on state law, 
then state rules determine the tolling effect of a class suit, even if all litigation occurs in federal 
court.”). In context, Judge Easterbrook’s use of “tolling effect” evidently includes the question whether 
there is any toll, and the description does not acknowledge the role of Section 1988 in Chardon or the 
Court’s insistence that state law respect the federal interest identified in American Pipe. 
261 See Bourne, supra note 242, at 492 (Chardon suggests “that in certain areas there is only 
limited need for federal uniformity and that once the need has been satisfied it is perfectly 
appropriate to consider the content of various rules of law before exercising choice”). 
262 See Semtek Int’l Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 U.S. 497, 507-08 (2001); Burbank, 
Interjurisdictional Preclusion, supra note 89, at 762-74; supra text accompanying notes 178–182. 
263 This is perhaps not surprising given the opacity of the Reconstruction-era statute, 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1988 (2012), which the Chardon Court was interpreting. For a convincing reinterpretation of that 
statute, see Seth F. Kreimer, The Source of Law in Civil Rights Actions: Some Old Light on Section 1988, 133 
U. PA. L. REV. 601, 618-33 (1985). Professor Kreimer, who recognized that the American Pipe tolling rule 
is federal common law, argued that Chardon is consistent with his interpretation of the statute. See id. at 
631 (“As long as federal interests are not adversely affected, even a tentative prediction of the state court’s 
interpretation of domestic statutory rules can function as the basis for statutory determinations.”). 
264 See Chardon v. Fumero Soto, 462 U.S. 650, 665-67 (1983) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
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important.265 We share this concern. The Court may not have appreciated the 
potential difficulty because the work of “echo[ing the] half-heard whispers of 
the [Puerto Rican] tribunals”266 had already been done by the lower federal 
courts in that case.267 Moreover, in that posture, the case presented a stark 
choice between the tolling effect prescribed in American Pipe (suspension), 
which would not have saved the plaintiffs’ claims, and that imputed to Puerto 
Rican law (renewal), which would have saved them. In making that choice, 
the Chardon Court appeared to take an ex post perspective. 
American Pipe simply asserts a federal interest in assuring the efficiency and 
economy of the class-action procedure. After class certification is denied, that 
federal interest is vindicated as long as each unnamed plaintiff is given as 
much time to intervene or file a separate action as he would have under a 
state savings statute applicable to a party whose action has been dismissed for 
reasons unrelated to the merits, or, in the absence of a statute, the time 
provided under the most closely analogous state tolling statute.268 
In our view, these dicta give insufficient attention to the potential adverse 
impact of uncertainty about the content of state law on the vindication of the 
federal interests sought to be protected in American Pipe and its progeny, 
whose tolling rule was designed to respond to and shape the incentives of risk 
averse putative class members ex ante.269 
Certainly, in a federal diversity case governed by a state limitations 
provision, the court should apply, and risk averse members of a putative class 
should easily be able to identify and rely on, an established state class action 
tolling rule, whatever its source, which is unambiguously more generous than 
the suspension rule of American Pipe.270 On the other hand, where state law is 
 
265 See id. at 667-68; Burbank, Of Rules and Discretion, supra note 105, at 695 (“There may be 
some questions of federal law, uncertainty about which, at least for a time, benefits the federal 
system, but limitations is not one of them.”). 
266 Paul A. Freund, Chief Justice Stone and the Conflict of Laws, 59 HARV. L. REV. 1210, 1212 
(1946) (describing the task of a federal court in diversity litigation after Erie). 
267 See Chardon, 462 U.S. at 654-55 (describing reasoning of the Court of Appeals in deciding 
that the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico would authorize class action tolling and in identifying the 
rule as to tolling effect). 
268 Id. at 661. 
269 Cf. Burbank, Of Rules and Discretion, supra note 105, at 694-96 (discussing costs that 
borrowed state limitations law for federal claims imposes on litigants and federal and state courts, 
and from perspective of the federal policies or interests sought to be advanced in underlying 
substantive law); Kreimer, supra note 263, at 631 (“The court should defer to the most appropriate 
state statutory analogy, bearing in mind that a state law is not appropriate if it fails to take into 
account practicalities that are involved in litigating federal civil rights claims and policies that are 
analogous to the goals of the Civil Rights Acts.”) (citation and internal quotations omitted). 
270 Cf. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(d) (2012) (prescribing a uniform federal tolling rule “unless State law 
provides for a longer tolling period”); In re Cty. of Orange, 784 F.3d 520, 530-31 (9th Cir. 2015) 
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silent on class action tolling, neither (putative) class members nor the federal 
court should be required to try to figure out whether that state’s courts would 
adopt it, which, given our conclusion that tolling is required by federal 
common law, could only be for the subsidiary purpose of divining the 
hypothetical tolling effect.271 The impulse to give effect to state policies cannot 
justify adopting a rule that would be “inconsistent with federal policy.”272 
In the middle ground between these situations, attention to state interests 
and to the capacity of federal common law to borrow state law may suggest 
that a state rule prescribing class action tolling effect should be borrowed as 
federal law in a diversity action in federal court so long as it is (1) established 
law for state-court class actions, and (2) would unambiguously afford 
absentees in the federal class action adequate time (whether more or less than 
suspension) either to seek to intervene or to bring independent actions if 
certification is denied or they opt out of a certified class.273 If this approach 
generated too many satellite disputes, the case would be stronger for the 
conservative rule with which we started this discussion. Either way, the 
burden should rest on the party urging the application of a state-law standard 
to show that the requirements of federal policy are satisfied. 
In order to prevent confusion and possible inadvertent loss of the ability 
to proceed independently, the federal court should identify the governing rule 
as to tolling effect, federal or state, in the order denying class certification or 
in the notice affording the right to opt out of a certified class.274 The power 
to do so is akin to the power a court has to specify those elements of the 
preclusive effect of its orders that lie within its knowledge and control: 
 
(holding that federal common law governs validity of pre-dispute jury-trial waiver in federal 
diversity litigation but that it borrows more protective state law as the federal rule). 
271 Cf. Chardon, 462 U.S. at 667-68 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (arguing that under the Court’s 
approach “the inquiry would appear to be, if state law did have a class-action tolling rule, which it 
does not, what would state law say with respect to one aspect of that rule’s effect?”). When the Court 
has engaged in this kind of hypothetical prognostication in other doctrinal settings, the results have 
not been satisfying. See, e.g., Marrese v. Am. Academy of Orthopaedic Surgeons, 470 U.S. 373, 374 
(1985) (requiring federal courts to determine under state law the claim preclusive effect of a state 
court judgment in a subsequent proceeding advancing claims within the exclusive subject matter 
jurisdiction of the federal courts). 
272 Bd. of Comm’rs of Jackson Cty. v. United States, 308 U.S. 343, 351-52 (1939). 
273 Cf. Great Plains Tr. Co. v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 492 F.3d 986, 998 (8th Cir. 2007) (finding 
that the “federal procedural interest [was] adequately protected in this case by application of the 
Kansas savings statute”). 
274 See Cal. Pub. Emps.’ Ret. Sys. v. ANZ Secs., Inc., 137 S. Ct. 2042,  2058 (2017) (Ginsburg, 
J., dissenting). (“Today’s decision impels courts and class counsel to take on a more active role in 
protecting class members’ opt-out rights.”) (internal citations omitted); see also Brief of Retired Fed. 
Judges as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 19-20, Cal. Pub. Emps.’ Ret. Sys. v. ANZ Secs., 
Inc., 137 S. Ct. 2042 (2017) (No. 16-373). 
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The preclusive rules of a jurisdiction can best be understood as a source of 
authorization for a court to attach prescriptive force to its judgment, along 
with a set of default rules that determine the extent of that prescriptive force 
in the absence of any express statement by the rendering forum . . . . Within 
the parameters established by the applicable preclusion doctrine . . . the 
rendering court has many tools at its disposal through which to shape the 
course of the proceedings and control the positive effects of its judgment.275 
American Pipe tolling and the requirement that it bind state courts in 
subsequent cases, like the preclusive effect of a federal judgment and its 
mandatory binding effect, are products of federal common law. In both cases, 
courts can and should specify the effects of their own orders when those 
effects lie within their knowledge and control and doing so will eliminate 
uncertainty that could undermine important federal policies. Just as when the 
question is the interjurisdictional reach of the law governing the preclusive 
effects of a federal judgment in a diversity case, “[f]rom the perspective of 
litigants . . . a system of [tolling] rules . . . keyed to the locus of subsequent 
litigation would be hopeless, either because it would be unpredictable or 
because it would be, functionally, a sham.”276 In other words, although 
complete uniformity may not be necessary as a matter of federal common law 
in the vertical dimension, it is necessary horizontally.277 
IV. CALPERS WITHOUT BLINKERS (LABELS) 
A. The Inadequacy (and Mischief) of Viewing American Pipe as Equitable 
Tolling 
In Part I, we demonstrate that, although the Court in CalPERS was correct 
that American Pipe tolling was not “mandated by the text of a statute or federal 
rule,” it was not correct in asserting that the rule is “based on traditional 
equitable powers, designed to modify a statutory time bar where its rigid 
application would create injustice.”278 The latter view finds essentially no 
support in American Pipe itself or in other cases in which the Court was actually 
engaging the foundations of class action tolling, as opposed to constructing a 
 
275 Tobias Barrington Wolff, Preclusion in Class Action Litigation, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 717, 760 (2005). 
276 Burbank, Interjurisdictional Preclusion, supra note 89, at 797; see also Burbank, Where’s the Beef?, 
supra note 196, at 100-101 (1996) (tying the governing rule in F2 to that applicable in F1 as “essential 
from the point of view of predictability” given matters considered in planning litigation strategy in F1). 
277 Cf. Lilly, supra note 188, at 322-23 (“Of course, the need for certainty does not tell us which 
solution, state or federal, is preferable. What it does suggest is that an authoritative uniform 
approach should be forged . . . .”). 
278 CalPERS, 137 S. Ct. at 2051-52. 
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string citation.279 Whether or not the product of teleology—with the end being 
the safe harbor of the Court’s statements about the unavailability of “equitable 
tolling” in cases governed by a “statute of repose”—the reasoning of the Court 
on this issue is a potentially fertile source of mischief. 
Suggesting that, in a case like the one before it, federal judges are limited 
to enforcing or interpreting statutes or Federal Rules, on the one hand, and 
implementing general principles of equity, on the other, the Court in 
CalPERS provides an impoverished account of the sources of federal law. As 
we also demonstrate in Parts I and II, that account is inconsistent with the 
Court’s federal common-law jurisprudence. 
The institutional interests that American Pipe was designed to serve were 
not conjured for the occasion in the absence of guidance in positive law.280 
They were immanent in the class action procedures provided by Rule 23 of 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which the Supreme Court promulgated 
under a delegation of legislative power in the REA. In Part II, we explore 
further the significance of that fact, as also of the fact that American Pipe 
tolling protects more than core policies animating Rule 23 as a whole. As the 
Court’s subsequent decisions in Eisen and Crown, Cork & Seal make clear, it 
also protects—preserves as “meaningful”—a specific provision of Rule 23 that 
was included to ensure that class actions certified under (b)(3) do not deprive 
absent members of due process of law. In both respects, Rule 23 serves not as 
the source of American Pipe tolling, but as its source of authority. From the 
perspective of the RDA, as law promulgated under an Act of Congress, Rule 
23 may require otherwise than that state tolling law apply. 
As we explain in Part III.A, since CalPERS was a case arising under a 
federal statute that contains its own limitations provision, there can be no 
doubt about federal judicial lawmaking power to fashion a valid tolling rule.281 
Whatever questions there may be about the validity of American Pipe tolling 
when applied in other contexts, this is its wheelhouse. Federal common law 
of whatever variety, however, must be consistent with federal statutes.282 
 
279 See Arivella v. Lucent Techs., Inc., 623 F. Supp. 2d 164, 176 n.7 (D. Mass. 2009) (Young, 
D.J.) (explaining that, although “many Circuit court decisions have referred to American Pipe tolling 
as equitable tolling,” the few courts required to probe the distinction between equitable and legal 
tolling–in cases involving statutes of repose–“recognize that American Pipe tolling is qualitatively 
different from equitable tolling”). 
280 Cf. Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Labor v. Preston, 873 F.3d 877, 884 (11th Cir. 2017) (“A statute of 
repose confers on a defendant a personal privilege of sorts, in the form of an immunity from further 
liability. While that privilege can’t just be snatched out of the defendant’s hand—certainly not, as 
Waldburger confirms, by a squishy doctrine like equitable tolling—there is nothing to prevent the 
defendant from voluntarily giving it away.”). 
281 See supra text accompanying notes 204–215. 
282 This statement is subject to the qualification that federal judge-made law that is necessary for 
the federal courts to function as such under Article III is valid even when contrary to a statute—inherent 
power of the strong type. See Burbank, Role of Congress, supra note 73, at 1686. 
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According to the Court, the fact that the applicable limitations provision 
contains two periods, one of which it labelled a “statute of repose,” meant that 
the American Pipe rule, which it labelled “equitable tolling,” could not apply. 
Having dispatched the latter notion, we turn to the question whether the 
former is similarly vulnerable and, even if not, whether statutes of repose are, 
or are always, impervious to federal common law that seeks to protect 
interests arising elsewhere in federal law. 
The CalPERS Court’s first sleight of hand, turning the American Pipe rule 
into “equitable tolling,” spared it the embarrassment of making federal 
limitations provisions that can be subsumed under the label, “statute of 
repose,” impregnable to judicial adjustment, even in the service of core 
policies underlying Federal Rules and of interests of constitutional 
magnitude. As to the latter interests, much stressed by Justice Ginsburg in 
dissent,283 another sleight of hand—turning the Wal-Mart Court’s 
observations about the right to opt out in (b)(3) class actions into an “ability that 
. . . should not be disregarded,” and the right itself into an “ability” or a 
“privilege”284—should cause Justice Scalia, the author of Wal-Mart, to spin in 
his grave.285 Indeed, one sleight of hand facilitated the other, since it is easier to 
 
283 See CalPERS, 137 S. Ct. at 2056 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“Given the due process 
underpinning of the opt-out right, I resist rendering the right illusory for CalPERS and similarly 
situated class members.”) (citations omitted); id. at 2057 (“CalPERS positioned itself to exercise its 
constitutional right to go it alone, cutting loose from a monetary settlement it deemed insufficient 
. . . .”); id. (“Absent a protective claim filed within that period, those members stand to forfeit their 
constitutionally shielded right to opt out of the class and thereby control the prosecution of their 
own claims for damages.”) (citing Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 363 (2011)). 
284 Here is the pertinent part of the cited discussion in Wal-Mart: 
In the context of a class action predominantly for money damages we have held that 
absence of notice and opt-out violates due process. While we have never held that to 
be so where the monetary claims do not predominate, the serious possibility that it 
may be so provides an additional reason not to read Rule 23(b)(2) to include the 
monetary claims here. 
Wal-Mart, 564 U.S. at 363 (citations omitted). Passing the common error of representing Shutts’ 
holding about due process for purposes of state court jurisdiction as a general proposition applicable 
to federal court proceedings, “an ability that . . . should not be disregarded” hardly seems a fair 
reading of that which the Wal-Mart Court called a “right” protected by the Due Process Clause 
(CalPERS was a (b)(3) class action). 
We doubt that Justice Kennedy’s subsequent use of “privilege” (i.e., after “ability”) was anything 
other than elegant variation on a rhetorical sleight of hand. Yet, a recent exploration of the “right-
privilege distinction” by our colleague, Shyam Balganesh, notes that “[e]ven though rights are 
usually accompanied by privileges, situations do exist where privileges remain unprotected by rights, 
and it is here that the distinction begins to assume practical significance.” Shyamkrishna Balganesh, 
Demystifying the Right to Exclude: Of Property, Inviolability, and Automatic Injunctions, 31 HARV. J.L. & 
PUB. POL’Y 593, 605 (2008) (footnote omitted). 
285 Undoubtedly, however, he rests in peace. See Burbank & Farhang, Class Actions and the 
Counterrevolution, supra note 4, at 1519 tbl.2 (showing that Justice Scalia ranked third lowest in pro-class-
action votes (25%), after Justice Thomas (18%), and Justice Kennedy (17%), in cases from 1960 to 2014). 
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delimit judge-made law implementing general principles of equity for this 
purpose than it is such law that was designed in part to keep a promise, the 
integrity of which implicates not just the interests of litigants and the impact of 
their behavior on the federal courts, but the constitutionality of Rule 23(b)(3). 
B. The Inadequacy (and Mischief) of Viewing Section 13 as a “Statute of Repose” 
How, then, should CalPERS have been decided if, rather than hiding 
behind the “equitable tolling” label, the Court had recognized the rule 
emerging from American Pipe and its progeny as federal common law created 
to protect provisions of, and core policies animating, Rule 23? Without that 
cover, the Court could no longer rely on precedent exempting statutes of 
repose from equitable tolling.286 Would the general characteristics of statutes 
of repose identified by the Court in CalPERS support the conclusion that 
applying American Pipe tolling was inconsistent with the three-year bar in the 
Securities Act of 1933? 
In seeking to answer that question, one needs to resist the impulse simply 
to deconstruct “statutes of repose,” revealing the Court’s use of that concept 
as another convenient label, like “equitable tolling,” that invites manipulation 
and lacks probative value in resolving a specific question of legislative 
intent.287 To be sure, the Court’s opinion—including the main source for its 
disquisition on statutes of repose, Justice Kennedy’s opinion for the Court in 
CTS Corp. v. Waldburger288—provides ample evidence for skepticism that here 
at last is refutation of the fallacy of unitary meaning289: from Congress’s 
apparent failure ever to use the term “statute of repose,”290 to a 1979 legal 
 
286 Justice Ginsburg’s dissent implicitly attacked the notion that statutes of repose should be 
immune to American Pipe tolling. See CalPERS, 137 S. Ct. at 2056 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) 
(“Respondents, in other words, received what § 13’s repose period was designed to afford them: notice 
of their potential liability within a fixed time window.”). That opinion did not, however, dispute the 
majority’s characterization of American Pipe tolling as “equitable tolling” or deal directly with precedent 
on which the majority relied for the proposition that statutes of repose are immune to equitable tolling. 
287 See Recent Cases, 130 HARV. L. REV. 1760, 1761 (2017) (discussing Stein v. Regions Morgan 
Keegan Select High Income Fund, Inc., 821 F.3d 780 (6th Cir. 2016)); id. (“By emphasizing formal, 
categorical—and ultimately indeterminate—distinctions, Stein reached a rule out of step with 
American Pipe, a decision principally concerned with the practical necessity of class action tolling.”). 
288 134 S. Ct. 2175 (2014). 
289 See Walter Wheeler Cook, “Substance” and “Procedure” in the Conflict of Laws, 42 YALE L.J. 333, 337 
(1933) (“The tendency to assume that a word which appears in two or more legal rules, and so in connection 
with more than one purpose, has and should have precisely the same scope in all of them, runs all through 
legal discussions. It has all the tenacity of original sin and must constantly be guarded against.”). 
290 ”Congress has used the term ‘statute of limitations’ when enacting statutes of repose . . . 
And petitioner does not point out an example in which Congress has used the term ‘statute of 
repose.’” CTS Corp. v. Waldburger 134 S. Ct. 2175, 2185 (2014). 
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dictionary definition of statutes of limitations as statutes of repose,291 to 
generalizations based on country-wide surveys.292 This criticism might, 
however, be thought a small place to stick. As we discuss in Part I, when 
addressing the question of consistency with congressional intent, the Court 
in American Pipe itself discussed the policies animating statutes of limitations 
at a high level of abstraction.293 
Since, however, a judicially-crafted tolling rule, like all federal common 
law, must be consistent with any federal statute to which it may be applied, 
the generality of the policy analysis in American Pipe does no harm so long as 
it must yield to persuasive evidence that any particular statute is animated by 
different policies, with which tolling would be inconsistent. The same must 
be true when the question is whether American Pipe tolling is consistent with 
section 13 of the 1933 Securities Act. A label, and the generalized policy 
analysis that it is thought to entrain, cannot properly occlude actual inquiry 
concerning congressional purpose. That is particularly true of a label—
“statute of repose”—that could not conceivably have had any meaning, as 
such, to the members of Congress in 1933 or 1934.294 
In searching for evidence concerning the “nature and purpose of the 3-year 
bar”295 at issue in CalPERS, it is important to keep in mind that the landscape 
for which Congress was legislating in the mid-1930s was different from today’s 
landscape in a number of potentially salient respects. “Statutes of repose” are 
not all that members would not have recognized. They would not have 
recognized, and were not legislating for, the modern damages class action. The 
lawsuits they had in mind were lawsuits brought by individuals (or entities) 
on their own behalf. Reconciling the purposes of federal limitations law with 
representative actions brought under Rule 23(b)(3) was, of course, the problem 
that confronted the Court in American Pipe. It was also the problem that 
confronted the Court in CalPERS, but you would never know it. 
 
291 See id. at 2186 (noting the entry, “[s]tatutes of limitations are statutes of repose,” in 1979 
edition of Black’s Law Dictionary). The Supreme Court said the same thing in the same year. See 
United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 117 (1979) (stating, after generally describing “statutes of 
limitations,” that “[t]hese enactments are statutes of repose”). 
292 See Waldburger, 134 S. Ct. at 2182-83 (repeatedly relying on 54 C.J.S., Limitations of 
Actions § 7 (2010)). Such reliance may be defensible in Waldburger, which concerned the scope of a 
1986 amendment to CERCLA that preempts state “statutes of limitations” applicable to tort actions 
in certain circumstances. See 42 U.S.C. § 9658 (2012). 
293 See supra text accompanying note 50. 
294 The Waldburger Court concluded “that general usage of the legal terms has not always been 
precise, but the concept that statutes of repose and statutes of limitations are distinct was well 
enough established to be reflected in [1982].” 134 S. Ct. at 2186. It was not established at all fifty years 
earlier. For a thorough discussion of product liability statutes of repose, see McGovern, supra note 25. 
According to the author, “at least five definitions of ‘statute of repose’ [were] in use” in 1981. Id. at 
582. He also noted that the “first product liability statute of repose was passed in 1977.” Id. at 588. 
295  Cal. Pub. Emps.’ Ret. Sys. v. ANZ Secs., Inc., 137 S. Ct. 2042, 2048 (2017).  
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Having outsourced the work of distinguishing statutes of repose from 
statutes of limitations to Waldburger, the CalPERS Court asserted that (1) the 
“3-year time bar in §13 reflects the legislative objective to give a defendant a 
complete defense to any suit after a certain period,”296 (2) “[f]rom the 
structure of §13, and the language of its second sentence, it is evident that the 
3-year bar is a statute of repose,”297 and (3) “[the ‘in no event’] instruction 
admits of no exception and on its face creates a fixed bar against future 
liability.”298 Moreover, although the Court acknowledged that “the question 
whether a tolling rule applies to a given statutory time bar is one ‘of statutory 
intent,’”299 it had already concluded that the “history of the 3-year provision 
also supports its classification as a statute of repose,” and that the “evident 
design of the shortened statutory period was to protect defendants’ financial 
security in fast-changing markets by reducing the open period for potential 
liability.”300 Finally, in recapitulating its reasoning before addressing the 
petitioner’s “four counterarguments,”301 the Court restated its conclusions 
that “the 3-year limit is a statute of repose . . . [a]nd [that] the object of a 
statute of repose, to grant complete peace to defendants, supersedes the 
application of a tolling rule based in equity.” In short, “the text, purpose, 
structure, and history of the statute all disclose the congressional purpose to 
offer defendants full and final security after three years.”302 
The problems here are not confined to the use of a label or to its 
anachronistic use.303 The Court’s “structural” analysis fails actually to engage 
the relationship between the two periods in section 13, and its attribution of 
congressional purpose equivocates about the nature of the “full and final 
security” offered by the 3-year bar. 
As to the question of structure, recalling that, when Congress enacted 
section 13 in 1933 and amended it in 1934, the lawsuits in mind were those 
brought by individuals, the text suggests two purposes: first, to require those 
who had discovered (or reasonably should have discovered) their injury to sue 
within one year, and second to set an outer limit for bringing suit, even if no 
injury had been discovered, at three years.304 Unburdened by a label, let alone 
 
296 Id. at 2049. 
297 Id. 
298 Id. 
299 Id. at 2050 (quoting Lozano v. Montoya Alvarez, 134 S. Ct. 1224, 1226 (2014)). 
300 Id. 
301 Id. at 2052. 
302 Id. 
303 See McGovern, supra note 25, at 621 (“The precise meaning attributed to th[e] statute in a 
particular set of circumstances is far more important than its label . . . . Thus, great care should be 
exercised in determining the precise meaning and applicability of any given statute of repose.”). 
304 As to the use of the discovery rule in legislation, Professor Corman concludes that the 
“legislative purpose in placing an absolute limit on the time for discovery is to assure the potential 
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subsequent (nationwide) experience that the Waldburger Court invoked when 
reifying “statutes of repose,” Congress appears to have been aware that 
unvarnished limitations periods governing actions for fraud were usually 
mitigated by a discovery rule, and thus to have spared the judiciary the need 
to furnish one. In that light, the “in no event” language that introduces the 
3-year bar would appear to speak, and to speak only, to the discovery issue. 
Accordingly, when the focus is on the structure of the particular statutory 
provision at issue in CalPERS, even if American Pipe tolling were a variety of 
“equitable tolling”—which it is not—it should not be foreclosed.305 
As to congressional purpose, which attention to structure has already 
illuminated, since a lawsuit brought one day short of three years (and within 
one year of discovery) would be timely under section 13, and since such a 
lawsuit might take years to come to judgment or settlement, “full and final 
security after three years”306 cannot mean security from potential liability. The 
Court elsewhere appears to acknowledge as much when it refers to “a fixed bar 
against future liability”307 and “the open period for potential liability.”308 
Similarly, “complete defense” and “complete peace” do not necessarily 
mean the same thing.309 Only the latter seems to speak to a limitations policy 
with which those who enacted and amended section 13—written in the 1930s 
and with individual litigation in mind—would have been familiar: enabling 
those who are subject to the regulatory commands of the 1933 Securities Act, 
as amended, to move on, free of fear of undiscovered claims, after three years. 
C. The Limits of Textualism 
Textualism has its limits. The Court made no effort to square its reading 
of section 13 with the history of that provision, other than to note that the 
two periods were shortened in 1934 and to speculate about why that was 
 
defendant of a time for repose, while removing the uncertainty and unpredictable cost of open-
ended litigation that is possible under the judicially created discovery rule.” 2 CALVIN W. CORMAN, 
LIMITATION OF ACTIONS § 11.2 (1991); see also 1 id. § 1.3.2.1  (describing five different definitions 
of “statutes of repose”). 
305 In her dissent in Waldburger, Justice Ginsburg posed the, apparently rhetorical, question: 
“What is a repose period, in essence, other than a limitations period unattended by a discovery rule?” 
CTS Corp. v. Waldburger, 134 S. Ct. 2175, 2190 (2014) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). That appears to be 
an accurate statement of the function of the 3-year bar in section 13. The Court’s jurisprudence of 
labels in this domain, however, appears to make a “statute of repose” impregnable to all equitable 
tolling doctrines, not just the core discovery doctrine. Equitable tolling may be appropriate in other 
circumstances, including some in which defendants are fully aware of claims against them within the 
statutory period. See, e.g., Burnett v. N.Y. Cent. R.R. Co., 380 U.S. 424 (1965). 
306 CalPERS, 137 S. Ct. at 2053. 
307 Id. at 2049. 
308 Id. at 2050. 
309 See supra text accompanying notes 296, 302. 
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done.310 This is perhaps understandable from those who prefer speculation 
about what is plausible to evidence,311 and labels to analysis. Those who 
“prefer the messiness of lived experience to the tidiness of unrealistically 
parsimonious models”312 may wish at least to inquire whether there is 
pertinent legislative history. Indeed there is. 
There is no reference to a “statute of repose,” or to “repose” as a term 
connected with time limitations for bringing suit, in the legislative histories 
of the 1933 or 1934 Acts. There is evidence, however, that the Congress that 
considered and adopted amendments to the two-period structure in the 1933 
Act intended to implement a general policy of limitations law. This policy 
sought, at a certain point, to enable potential defendants to go on with their 
lives free of the fear of lawsuits. 
The legislative history of the 1933 Act does not contain useful discussion 
of Section 13.313 The original House bill, H.R. 4314, did not have any 
limitations provision.314 In hearings held on that bill, there was discussion 
about an unspecified statute of limitations applying “to a fraud action 
authorized by this legislation.”315 There was also discussion of the general rule 
that in fraud actions the statute is not “set in motion until the fraud [i]s 
discovered”316 and of the need to put something in the bill to deal with 
situations where someone, having discovered the fraud, “might sleep on his 
rights, or bide his time.”317 A successor House bill included the 2-year/10-year 
 
310 See supra text accompanying note 300. 
311 See, e.g., Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009). 
312 Stephen B. Burbank, On the Study of Judicial Behaviors,: Of Law, Politics, Science, and 
Humility, in WHAT’S LAW GOT TO DO WITH IT?: WHAT JUDGES DO, WHY THEY DO IT, AND 
WHAT’S AT STAKE 53 (Charles Gardner Geyh ed., 2011). 
313 Perhaps that helps to explain why the account in one of the few amicus briefs that discussed 
the legislative history of the 1933 and 1934 Acts was so tendentious. See Brief for the Secs. Indus. 
and Fin. Mkt. Assoc. and the Clearing House Assoc. L.L.C. as Amici Curiae in Support of 
Respondents at 8-9, Cal. Pub. Emps.’ Ret. Sys. v. ANZ Secs., Inc., 137 S. Ct. 2042 (2017) (No. 16-
373) (hereinafter “SIMFA and CHA amicus brief”) (repeatedly misattributing concerns about 
proposed director liability provisions to concerns about limitations). 
314 See H.R. 4314, 73d Cong. (1933). 
315 Federal Securities Act, Hearing on H.R. 4314 Before the H. Comm. on Int’l and Foreign 
Commerce, 73d Cong. 215 (1933) (statement of Rep. Clarence F. Lea). 
316 Id. (statement of Mr. Samuel Houston Thompson, former Chairman, Federal Trade 
Commission). 
317 Id.  
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provision that was finally enacted,318 and it was described as “the period of 
limitations provided by section 13.”319 
The legislative history of the 1934 Act, by contrast, contains a great deal 
of Senate hearing testimony and floor debate that sheds light on congressional 
purpose. Because of the overlap between Section 17 of the 1934 Act and the 
1933 Act, it was determined to make the limitations periods the same, which 
required an amendment to Section 13 of the 1933 Act. The earliest discussion 
occurred at a Senate Hearing on February 28, 1934, during the testimony of 
Thomas Corcoran. Senator Kean was concerned that Section 17(e) of the bill, 
which then provided a 2-year period after discovery “means nothing but 
blackmail.”320 Elaborating, he observed: “They discover it after the market 
has gone down, and after something has happened, and they are looking for 
mistakes, and years afterwards there is a liability that carries to your 
grandchildren and great-grandchildren.”321 After a further exchange, 
Corcoran observed: “What you mean to say is that there should be a 
provision, or statute of limitations, in here to the effect that the action may 
be maintained at any time within 2 years after the discovery of the violation, 
but in no event more than 6 years after the actual filing of the false report.”322 
 
318 See H.R. 5480, § 13, 73d Cong. (1933). James Landis’s personal account of the legislative 
history of the 1933 Act makes it clear that the House took the leadership role, “the Senate Committee 
on Banking and Currency [being] busy with its investigation of securities transactions and securities 
markets,” which undergirded the 1934 Act. James M. Landis, The Legislative History of the Securities 
Act of 1933, 28 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 29, 41 (1959); see also id. at 42, 45, 48. 
319 H.R. REP. NO. 73-85, at 12 (1933). The Senate bill, which was the subject of a Senate 
Report, included a “5-year limitation . . . upon all civil suits, actions, or proceedings brought by 
purchasers.” S. REP. NO. 73-47, at 6 (1933). As is evident from the enacted bill and the Conference 
Report, the House version prevailed. See H. REP. NO.73-152, at 12 (1933) (Conf. Rep.). 
320 Stock Exchange Practices, Hearing on S. Res. 84 (72d Cong.) and S. Res. 56 and S. Res. 97 (73d 
Cong.) Before the S. Comm. on Banking and Currency, 73d Cong. 6565 (1934) [hereinafter “Senate 
Hearing”] (statement of Senator Hamilton F. Kean). 
321 Id. 
322 Id. (statement of Mr. Thomas Gardiner Corcoran, Counsel, Reconstruction Finance 
Corporation). Shortly thereafter, he referred to section 13 of the 1933 Act: “There is a provision in 
the Securities Act which requires you to bring suit within a certain time after the discovery, but 
there is a cut-off at 10 years. You wish something analogous to that?” Id; see also id. at 6718 (Ferdinand 
Pecora, chief counsel to the Committee who led its investigation observed about section 17(e) that 
“[t]here might well be added a provision that ‘in any event such action will be brought within 6 years 
of the alleged violation.’”); id. at 6993 (in response to concern “that 5 or 6 or 7 years from now you 
can discover that something has been violated,” Pecora stated: “It has already been suggested, and 
as far as I know it has found favor, that there be a further limitation, that such an action must be 
brought within 6 years.”); id. at 7561 (in response to concern expressed by attorney for N.Y. Stock 
Exchange that, if 2-year period in draft was “after discovery, then we believe there should be some 
limited period beyond which no action could be brought,” and reference to committee discussion 
“some weeks ago, and general agreement that there should be some maximum limitation, beyond 
which no action could be brought,” Pecora acknowledged the prior discussion and the “suggestion 
was that action must be brought within 2 years after the discovery of the violation, but in no event 
could it be brought after 6 years from the commission of the violation.”); id. at 7743 (witness 
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By far the most extensive discussion of limitations occurred in the Senate 
on May 7, 1934, when Senators considered amendments to the existing bill 
(S. 3240) and a conforming amendment to the 1933 Act. The result of the 
debate was the adoption of amendments changing the proposed 2-year/6-year 
structure to 1-year/5-year.323 
In response to Senator King’s assertion that in most States a fraud suit 
must be brought within 2 years, and “that it seems to me [5 or 6 years] was a 
rather long time,”324 Senator Byrnes replied: “Suit must be brought within 1 
year after discovery of the statement but the untrue or false statement might 
not be discovered for 4 years after its utterance. It means only that there is 
but 1 year after discovery of the statement in which action may be brought. 
In the states a suit may be brought within 4 years. It simply means that after 
5 years or 6 years a suit may not be brought at all.”325 
Much of the debate was occasioned by Senator Norris’s objection to 
having two periods instead of one, such as six years. His main arguments were 
that the short period keyed to discovery would foment litigation because there 
would be inadequate time to negotiate a settlement before having to sue, and 
because defendants would contend that the plaintiff had been on inquiry 
notice.326 In pushing back, those who supported a two-period provision made 
a number of arguments. To Senator Norris’s initial question,327 Senator 
Fletcher, Chair of the Committee on Banking and Currency, who introduced 
the bill and was its floor manager,328 responded: 
 
concerned that “2 years after the cause of action accrues is unduly restrictive,” arguing for discovery 
rule and approving of Pecora’s suggested “statute of limitations of 2 years after discovery, but in no 
event more than 6 years after the violation.”). 
323 See 78 CONG. REC. 8198-8202 (1934). 
324 Id. at 8198. 
325 Id. Senator Byrnes was a member of the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency, where the 
bill originated, and which held the hearings discussed above. See Senate Hearing, supra note 320, at ii. 
326 See 78 CONG. REC. at 8198-8201. 
327 ”Why should we have one time fixed for the final limitation and another time fixed as a 
limitation based on the discovery of the fraud? There will be many cases where the fraud will not be 
discovered within a year.” Id. at 8198. Later in the debate, Senator Barkley made it clear that, if the 
Senate were to follow Senator Norris’s approach and adopt one period, “we would make the 
limitation apply not only to the discovery of the fraud but to the committing of the fraud also, so 
that a man would be barred at the end of 5 years, or 4 years, or whatever time we fix, from bringing 
suit for damages upon a false representation on a material commission, no matter when he might have 
discovered the fraud.” Id. at 8201 (emphasis added). Barkley was also a member of the Senate 
Committee on Banking and Currency. See Senate Hearing, supra note 320, at ii. 
328 For reliance on sponsors’ statements in interpreting legislation, see, e.g., Schwegmann 
Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384, 394-95 (1951) (“It is the sponsors that we look to when 
the meaning of the statutory words is in doubt.”), quoted with approval in, e.g., Nat’l Woodwork Mfrs. 
Ass’n v. NLRB, 386 U.S. 612, 640 (1967); Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast Bldg. & 
Constr. Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568, 585 (1988); see also William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 
37 UCLA L. REV. 621, 638 (1990) (“[S]ponsors are the Members of Congress most likely to know 
what the proposed legislation is all about, and other Members can be expected to pay heed to their 
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Mr. President, the thought was that a man ought not to delay suit more than 
1 year after he discovers the fraud. If he has been injured and finds that he 
has been injured, he ought to bring his action within a reasonable time, and 
we fix that time at 1 year. If he has not discovered it, the person who made the 
misrepresentation or false statement ought to feel safe at some reasonable time that he 
will not be disturbed.329 
In response to Senator Norris’s argument that the 1-year period would 
increase litigation because it left too little time for negotiated compromise,330 
Senator Byrnes observed: 
Ordinarily I should be disposed to agree with the Senator that a provision of 
this kind would require suit to be brought too quickly. There were, however, two 
questions confronting us. The point has been made that if fraud should be 
discovered after 2 years, suit could be brought within 10 years. It was argued, and 
with considerable force, that, inasmuch as the particular suit referred to in this 
section might be a suit against the directors of a corporation for omission to state 
a material fact in securing the registration of an issue, it would deter men from 
serving on boards of directors, because the man might die and his estate would 
be liable possibly 8 years after his death to a suit brought by an individual. 
. . . . 
[I]t was agreed that we should modify it to the extent of providing that if a 
man discovered the falsity of a statement, or the omission to state a material 
fact, and wished to sue the director of a corporation, he ought to bring suit 
within 1 year; but, knowing that he might not possibly learn of the falsity or 
omission for some years, we provided that it must be done within 5 years, 
and this provision was then changed to accord with the amendment which 
the Senator from Florida has offered. I think the Senator is familiar with the 
purpose; but there were two things to be considered. Looking at the matter 
from the standpoint of the director of a corporation, one was that we should bring to 
an end his fear, or the fear of his estate, of a suit. At the same time we desired to 
preserve the right of a man who might not discover the falsity of a statement for 4 
years, because in the very nature of things he might not do so; but upon discovery, he 
should not be denied the right to bring a suit.331 
 
characterizations of the legislation.”); id. at 640 (“[S]tatements by legislators at hearings or on the 
floor are not as authoritative as those of sponsors and floor managers, unless the speakers can be 
identified as “players” on that particular bill.”). 
329 78 CONG. REC. at 8198 (emphasis added). In quoting this sentence, the SIMHA and CHA 
amicus brief, supra note 313, at 10, omitted “[i]f he has not discovered it.” 
330 See id. at 8199. 
331 Id. at 8199-8200 (emphasis added). 
66 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 167: 1 
Shortly thereafter the following colloquy occurred: 
Mr. Norris. The Senator now is speaking, however, of a man who might be 
liable who dies, and whose estate might be liable. That would be true if we 
made the period 1 year. His estate might be liable at any time within 6 years 
under the language as it stands now. 
Mr. Byrnes. Yes. 
Mr. Norris. If the suit were commenced within that statute of limitations, if 
it were like the suit from Chicago the other day, it might last 11 years longer, 
and somebody else might die of old age before getting through with it. 
Mr. Byrnes. The only difference is that this period is 5 instead of 10 years, as 
was provided under the Securities Act of 1933. This is just 5 years better; that 
is all.332 
The rest of the legislative history is not illuminating. The presentation of 
the Conference Report in the Senate describes, without explaining, the 
change from 2/10 to 1/3.333 
The legislative history of the 1934 Act confirms that “statute of repose” 
was not a concept known to Congress in the mid-1930s, let alone a concept 
with invariant characteristics, and that the lawsuits for which they were 
legislating were lawsuits brought on an individual (nonclass) basis. It also 
confirms what the structure of Section 13 suggests, namely that, in settling on 
two periods in conforming amendments for Section 13 of the 1933 Act, those 
responsible for shaping the legislation sought to implement different 
purposes of limitations law that they deemed salient for claims based on 
fraud. They sought to accommodate the problem of undiscovered fraud, while 
providing an incentive to potential plaintiffs to sue promptly after discovery 
and setting an outer limit on the period during which potential defendants 
need to worry about lawsuits. Finally, the legislative history confirms that, as 
the language and structure of Section 13 suggest, the longer period cuts off 
undiscovered claims. Nothing in that language or history supports an 
 
332 Id. at 8200. 
333 See 78 Cong. Rec. 10,111 (1934); see also HOUSE REP. NO. 73-1838, at 42 (1934) (Conf. Rep); 78 Cong. 
Rec. 10,265 (1934). In a statement made after the conference report was adopted, Senator Byrnes observed: 
Whereas the existing law permits a suit to be brought at any time within 10 years after 
the filing of the registration, the new law will permit such a suit to be brought only 
within 3 years. It has been argued heretofore that a director would be uncertain as to 
the settlement of his estate in case of death because of the liability that would exist for 
a period of 10 years. Under the new law, a suit must be brought within 3 years. 
Id. at 10,186. 
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interpretation that would insulate defendants from claims sub judice of which, 
brought by those of whom, they were already aware. 
In sum, Justice Ginsburg and the three other dissenting justices in 
CalPERS were correct. “Respondents, in other words, received what § 13’s 
repose period was designed to afford them: notice of their potential liability 
within a fixed time window.”334 As a result, applying American Pipe tolling, 
however characterized, is consistent with Section 13. The refusal to do so, on 
the other hand, portends increased litigation activity, inimical to core Rule 23 
policies, of the very sort that prompted the Court to fashion a federal 
common law tolling rule in the first place. Moreover, that refusal provides an 
incentive for dilatory behavior by defendants, on the one hand, and for 
premature certification decisions by the court, on the other hand,335 neither 
of which well serves the interests of the federal courts.336 Finally, the refusal 
to apply American Pipe tolling renders the right to opt out of a certified 
23(b)(3) class action worthless in many cases, which, particularly because the 
judiciary had the power to avoid that result, exacerbates tension with the 
received account of what preserves the constitutionality of that provision. 
CONCLUSION  
CalPERS is an analytical house of cards. Indeed, the closing paragraphs of 
the Court’s opinion strongly suggest that the decision is teleological, and they 
confirm that it is not the product of careful or informed legal reasoning: 
The statute of repose transforms the analysis. In a hypothetical case with a 
different statutory scheme, consisting of a single limitations period without 
an additional outer limit, a court’s equitable power under American Pipe in 
 
334  Cal. Pub. Emps.’ Ret. Sys. v. ANZ Secs., Inc., 137 S. Ct. 2042, 2056 (2017) (Ginsburg, J., 
dissenting).  
335 See Professors’ Amicus Brief, supra note 12, at 14-15. 
336 In this connection, we note the Resh Court’s discussion of the 2003 amendments to Rule 
23, which loosened the time frame for making a ruling on class certification from “as soon as 
practicable” to “an early practicable time.” See China Agritech, Inc. v. Resh, 138 S. Ct. 1800, 1807 
(2018); FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(1)(A). The change aimed primarily to curtail the practice adopted by 
some district courts of issuing early, conditional rulings on certification that permitted suits to 
proceed as class actions without a thorough and rigorous analysis to determine whether the 
requirements of Rule 23 were satisfied. The practice gave plaintiffs powerful leverage to demand 
class settlements that were potentially unwarranted. See Tobias Barrington Wolff, Discretion in Class 
Certification, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 1897, 1913-1914 (2014). Resh finds in this amendment “a preference 
for preclusion of untimely successive class actions by instructing that class certification should be 
resolved early on.” Resh, 138 S. Ct. at 1807. This is a tendentious account. The primary concern 
driving the amendment was precipitous grants of class certification, not precipitous denials as Resh 
suggests, and the additional leeway that the change permits to consider competing applications from 
multiple aspiring class counsel will be pertinent only in those cases where the litigation context 
facilitates such competition, an issue that Resh treats with imprecision. See infra text accompanying 
note 343. 
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many cases would authorize the relief petitioner seeks. Here, however, the 
Court need not consider how equitable considerations should be formulated 
or balanced, for the mandate of the statute or repose takes the case outside 
the bounds of the American Pipe rule. 
The final analysis, then, is straightforward. The 3-year time bar in § 13 of the 
Securities Act is a statute of repose. Its purpose and design are to protect 
defendants against future liability. The statute displaces the traditional power 
of courts to modify statutory time limits in the name of equity. Because the 
American Pipe tolling rule is rooted in those equitable powers, it cannot 
extend the 3-year period. Petitioner’s untimely filing of its individual action 
is ground for dismissal.337 
As we noted at the beginning of this Article, however, our primary goal is 
not to demonstrate the error of the decision in CalPERS. It is, rather, to 
minimize the damage that can be caused in other cases by the Court’s opinion. 
To that end, we have sought to demonstrate that (1) the rule emerging from 
American Pipe and its progeny cannot properly be deemed “equitable tolling,” 
(2) federal judicial power is not confined to interpreting or enforcing statutes 
on the one hand, and implementing equitable principles on the other, and (3) 
American Pipe tolling is the product of federal common law. 
The Court spoke again on these issues shortly before publication of this 
Article, sending mixed signals in an apparent effort to clarify CalPERS’s 
analytical mischief. In China Agritech, Inc. v. Resh,338 the Court held that 
extending tolling to successive class actions would not serve “[t]he watchwords 
of American Pipe[:] efficiency and economy of litigation, a principal purpose of 
Rule 23,” whereas “allowing no tolling for out-of-time class actions [would] 
propel putative class representatives to file suit well within the limitation 
period and seek certification promptly.”339 
In some respects, Resh represents an improvement on the missteps the 
Court made in CalPERS. The majority opinion, authored by Justice 
Ginsburg, frames American Pipe tolling as a doctrine that seeks to carry into 
effect policies of “efficiency and economy of litigation” bound up in Rule 
23340—a correct statement of the doctrine as far as it goes, although the Court 
ignores the goal of preserving a meaningful right to opt out in actions 
certified under Rule 23(b)(3). Unfortunately, the Resh opinion also exhibits 
 
337 CalPERS, 137 S. Ct. at 2055; see also McGovern, supra note 25, at 605-606 (“Terms such as 
‘statute of limitations’ or ‘statute of repose’ often are used without an explanation of their meaning 
or rationale. Once affixed, however, these terms may be outcome determinative.”); id. at 620 
(referring to them as “outcome-determinative labels”). 
338 138 S. Ct. 1800 (2018). 
339 Id. at 1811. 
340 Id. at 1806. 
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serious inconsistencies, incorporating references to “equitable tolling” in key 
parts of its analysis, albeit in a more subsidiary role.341 The result is a mish-
mash, an attempted course correction that sometimes loses its way. The 
opinion for the Court had the support of eight Justices (all but Justice 
Sotomayor, who concurred in the judgment and wrote separately), and it may 
be that these continued references to equitable tolling concerns were the price 
of support for a majority ruling that was attempting to shift the primary focus 
back to the policies of Rule 23. 
We express no view here about the correctness of Resh’s conclusion that 
American Pipe tolling should not apply in successive class actions, but we do 
note cause for concern. Resh was a securities fraud action governed by the 
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA) as well as Rule 23. Justice 
Sotomayor cogently explains in her separate opinion that the majority’s 
argument about the lack of “diligence” shown by class members who did not 
seek a leadership role in the initial proceeding “makes sense only in the 
PSLRA context” and “does not follow in the generic Rule 23 context, where 
absent class members are most likely unaware of the existence of a putative 
class action.”342 The Court does not clearly tie its analysis on the point to the 
PSLRA, and it also leaves the impact of the multi-district litigation process 
almost entirely unaddressed.343 When combined with the Court’s inattention 
to opt-out rights, this lack of clarity on class action policy leaves considerable 
room for improvement in future cases, even if Resh can be read as shifting the 
primary focus back to the policies of Rule 23. 
As we demonstrate, that focus is essential to proper understanding in this 
domain, because it signals the distinction between sources of authority and 
sources of rules: Rule 23 is not the source of the rule in American Pipe; it is the 
source of authority. So understood, we argue, American Pipe tolling not only 
 
341 Perhaps the most egregious reappearance of the “equitable tolling” label comes in the Court’s 
response to an argument concerning Shady Grove Orthopedic Associates. v. Allstate Insurance Co., 559 
U.S. 393 (2010). Plaintiffs-respondents in Resh claimed that, since American Pipe tolling is available to 
subsequent plaintiffs as individuals, the text of Rule 23 requires that they be allowed to proceed via a 
putative class action. In rejecting that argument, the Court appears to disavow some poorly chosen 
language in Shady Grove that had suggested a lack of discretion in class certification decisions—a 
welcome development, if so. See Wolff, Discretion in Class Certification, supra note 33, at 1946-1951 
(urging this result). But the Court then invokes “American Pipe’s equitable tolling doctrine” when 
explaining why the text of Rule 23 does not support the respondents’ argument. See Resh, 138 S. Ct. 
at 1809. This is at odds with the course correction that the Court appears to implement earlier in the 
opinion. See also id. at 1814 n.2 (Sotomayor, J., concurring in the judgment) (repeating the CalPERS 
mistake and framing American Pipe as an equitable tolling doctrine). 
342 Resh, 138 S. Ct. at 1813 (Sotomayor, J., concurring in the judgment); see also id. at 1814 (“But 
in suits not covered by the PSLRA, absent class members may not know of the pending class action 
early enough to ‘aid’ the court, and will likely have to file a completely separate lawsuit if what they 
seek is lead-plaintiff status.”). 
343 Id. at 1811. 
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governs in federal class actions prosecuting federal claims and subject to federal 
limitations provisions; it also governs in federal diversity class actions 
prosecuting state claims and subject to state limitations provisions. Federal 
common law protects and carries into effect the opt-out right granted by Rule 
23 and aggregate litigation policies underlying the rule as a whole. These rights 
and policies represent an exercise of delegated legislative power and require 
that state law denying tolling to the members of a putative class action yield to 
the federal common-law rule.344 And whenever American Pipe tolling governs 
in a federal court as F1, it must also apply in state courts hearing the claims of 
(putative) class members as F2 in order to be fully effective in the initial 
proceeding. The Supremacy Clause requires interjurisdictional tolling.345 
 
 
 
 
 
 
344 See supra text accompanying notes 218–227. 
345 See supra text accompanying notes 205–215, 254–258. 
 
